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男性思維剖析-男性世界廣告小秘訣

（根據(jù)錄音整理并翻譯，ＧＥ和ＣＥＩＢＳ版權(quán)所有。如需轉(zhuǎn)載，必須先與ＣＥＩＢＳ市場及公共關(guān)系部取得聯(lián)系。）

湯姆多克托羅夫 [簡介]

智威湯遜-中喬廣告公司

東北亞區(qū)總裁兼大中華區(qū)首席執(zhí)行官

2003年7月3日

注：湯姆多克托羅夫先生基本上使用英文演講，但是偶爾也使用了中文。我們在此保持了演講內(nèi)容的原來風(fēng)貌。

Today we are going to be talking about the mind of Chinese men. This is actually the result of a lot of plans that we have and observations we had in the market about what is motivating men. Motivating. The secret of advertising - actually the secret of brand loyalty - the secret to non-commoditization, the secret to China's fundamental economic challenge, which is of course overproduction and a deflationary price environment is the creation of brands that demand a price premium.

The point is that advertising starts from the consumer inside. The consumer inside. The consumer psychology is what he is to profit. That's where loyalty comes from. That isn't just talking to an audience, but having a dialogue. What is a consumer inside? A consumer inside is fundamental. It answers the question why. 它解釋根本的東西，根本的行為。A consumer inside explains behaviour and practice. A consumer inside stops when you can no longer answer the question why. You know you have an inside when there is no more why. So what we are going to do today is ultimately using our experience to come up with what I call a "master consumer inside". That is the one thing you women need to know about Chinese men to secure their romantic loyalty. And then what we are going to do is to translate that inside into different, more specific marketing applications and advertising strategies. This is not quantitative. 不是定量的，是抽象的，是一種概念的。 今天的中國，是個(gè)歷史的機(jī)會(huì)。It is the new era, it is the new golden horizon that everyone of you can grab upon. So everything is perfect. Well, you know from my last presentation, nothing is perfect. The best inside has conflict. In all of us, in our heart, we have some conflicts. Are there underlying tensions? Now I hope, as I go forward, you can trust me when I say 中國男人比美國男人好很多。他們是最厲害的，最激進(jìn)的，最接受挑戰(zhàn)的。他們不是消極的，是積極的，只是他們還有一些弱點(diǎn)。所有文化，都有它們的長處和自己的弱點(diǎn)，對不對？Let's try to 坦誠相待。

（Video shows the Chinese character for man： 男）

這個(gè)是什么？What's on the top? 田；What's on the bottom? 力，OK? For our foreign guests here. This is the Chinese character for man. This is basically Chinese. Man's power in the field. Man works hard. Man does not have an easy life. He has burden. He has responsibility. Right? In China, in a Confucian society, man has to carry the weight of the family's success on the shoulder. And it has been this way for 2,500 years, 3,000 years, 4,000 years, 5,000 years. Patriarchy, 這個(gè)是孔子主義的社會(huì)。Confucian society is a patriarchic society. Confucian society which is ultimately what China still is today. Historically, woman has not had a lot of rights. The woman's primary obligation is to give birth to a child, a male heir. The man has the responsibility of succeeding and providing for the family. And it has been tough being a man in China. And it continues to be - tough to be a guy in China. You have so many responsibilities: 成家立業(yè)，三十而立,　even in honouring your ancestors. OK? So you don't have to just care for your family, you don't just care for your children, not just extended family, but even dead people. All right? It's tough being a man.

Now in a Confucian society, one of the things about Confucianism - its society is the world's first socially mobile society. By studying hard, you can move forward, it is also a regimented society, 就是說有很多的結(jié)構(gòu)，有很多等級制度的。So, luckily, men always knew where he stood; men always knew whether he was measuring up to what a successful man should be - has always been like this. How was this in Confucian society? Well, success has always been relatively narrow. The definition of success has always been relatively "窄，比較窄". Society defines success. Success is not the individual. Western culture ultimately relies on the individual to define his own success. Asian culture, Confucian culture primarily relies on a society structural definition of success. It was a regimented pattern. It was a pattern that did not leave a lot of room for interpretation. But on the positive side, at least I know the way. What was the way? Those who excel scholarship become officials. Let me try to read this:"學(xué)而優(yōu)則仕". How about this one? "勞心者治人，勞力者治于人"Those who work with mind rule; those who work with strength be ruled. In Chinese Confucian culture, the mind was the ultimate weapon. The mind was the ultimate weapon of success on the battlefield of life. Sharpen the mind, master the mind, you will succeed.

But not just intelligence - focusing intelligence, structural intelligence, regimented intelligence. There was a clear hierarchy by absorbing and understanding Confucian texts, 比如說四書五經(jīng)，等等. A man could move forward by becoming an expert at how Confucian defined the ideal society, and how successful dynasties and emperors defined the ideal society, all - mostly, more or less, give or take, they went up they went down, but they're still up there - Confucian precepts a man to succeed. There was a hierarchy, a narrow hierarchy. At the bottom of an imperial society were the merchants - those who worked with your hands. Excuse me, those who worked with your money. Actually, this has something in common with Europe in the Middle Ages. Jewish people, you know, 我是猶太人. The reason why Jewish people are so good with money is because when we were thrown out of most of the European society, the only thing we Jews were allowed to do was the dangerous work - touch the money. So we developed a special little skill. In China, it was the same as in Europe in a way, money was dirty. Well, it was not, but dealing with money was dirty. Farmers, they work with hands, they were the less level, they were producing something out of the earth in a fundamentally agricultural society. And finally scholars and officials, they were at the top of the hierarchy. There was not a lot of room for interpretation here.

Now if you received wisdom contained in the classics, you looked back, you didn't look forward. You looked back. You memorized what was prescribed, what was mandated. It was not an assimilative intellect, it was a logical, analytic intellect. There was of course a hierarchy, a structural route to success. The district exams - became government students, those who passed. This is by way of 2% of the population, or 2% of the people who took the test, then provincial exams - became employable men, then metropolitan exams - became presentable scholars, and finally the palace exams. 0.2% of those people taking the tests became advance scholars. And this system of the civil service exams, basically continued until the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and it reached the peak of regimentation of rigidity -- 不是靈活的，最高水平的死板 - in Qing Dynasty. So it was there from 2,000 years ago, 1,800 years ago really until 1900. But the good thing - there was one sure road to Rome - if I succeed at these tests, if I can master this knowledge, I will succeed. It is laid out for me. There is no guarantee that I can pass the tests, but there is guarantee that if I do pass the tests, things will be OK. Master your prescribed knowledge, assure your success, and ultimately, the success was within the control of yourself. If you sharpen your mind, if you take control of your mind, if you are able to discipline your intelligence and your intellect, you will succeed.

But then things changed. Mao came.

(Video shows the life during the Cultural Revolution )

You know the Chinese character for revolution is what? 革命, what's its meaning? It has two meanings, right? One is leather, the other is an re-establishment of a described order. The Chinese definition of revolution is not the same as an American, Western, French, British, Italian definition. When we say revolution we mean things are going differently, but when Chinese say revolution they mean putting it back the way it should be. And of course you don't call the Communist revolution a "革命"，我們叫它"解放"。But it was a "革命"in the Chinese sense of the word. Because in the Chinese sense of the word, there were still many aspects of Confucianism on which Mao based his control. One of them, again, was continued regimentation of how to succeed. The content changed a little now, but success was again based on the assimilation and understanding of prescribed knowledge. Success under Mao until the early 80's was based on the command of Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, now Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin knowledge. Pay off again from mastery. Pay off from mastery to become higher on the government structure in a Party career. Things are changing always… today, payoff does no longer come from mastery. Today, payoff comes from many, many more things, so things are no as easy to be articulated as they were in the past. There are many forces shaping Chinese men today.

Now, I do not want to suggest that American society does not also have a hierarchy. Of course, it too, has a hierarchy. But the social class system in America, although it is very hierarchical, we have, frankly speaking, we have lower lower, middle lower, upper lower, lower middle, middle middle, upper middle, lower upper, middle upper upper upper … OK? We've got a lot of it, the difference is that there are many combinations that go into what your social economic status, and they have equal weights. One, your family's background. I, for example, is a Jewish person, and it's going to be very difficult for me to become upper class, because upper class is more than just money. Family background, education, money … all of these come together into a very complex equation of what middle class means.

In China, the definition of social hierarchy has always been relatively narrow. What I am going to say is something some of you might find controversial. The definition of success in class has always been, just as what it was in the past and continues to be up today, relatively strictly defined. DEng Xiaoping, when he went to Guang Zhou in 1992, he said, "To get rich is glorious." He defined a new social hierarchy, a new social hierarchy of money and wealth-defining status. This is not to say that it is the only thing that defines status. Pay off will make somebody successful, admiring. Scholarship will, too. The fact is that relative to other cultures it is our contention that money defines success. We do believe in China, relative to other cultures, even other Asian … South-eastern Asian cultures and Japanese cultures, Taoist cultures for example, money takes on a new role, because it has been mandated and has been endorsed by leadership. Today, the hierarchy has reversed, but there are still a hierarchy - workers, farmers at the bottom (藍(lán)領(lǐng)工是最低水平的), public servants, officials and businessmen at the top, which is why of course Jiang Zemin "三個(gè)代表"is in fact a quiet revolution. It implicitly recognizes that they perhaps represent the advanced productive forces of society, maybe. The goal of modern society is singularly, more so than other cultures, try to get money and become rich. There are pressures to become rich. How many men here can get married before their girlfriends' parents know you can afford a nice apartment in downtown Shanghai. Money is still the definition of a reliable person - somebody who can provide a "踏實(shí)將來、美滿將來、幸福家庭". So, money is important.

Now capitalism, on the other hand, is a little bit different. Capitalism is ultimately rooted in entrepreneurism, not just money, not just the acquisition of wealth. Capitalism is rooted in individual's ability to say, "You know what, I think I disagree with this. I'm going to do something in my own way." Why is Bill Gates so admired? Bill Gates is so admired not just because he was rich, but because he dropped out of Harvard, because he was able to say, "I have a better way." And then you became rich. It is an independent risk-taking initiative. Entrepreneurism is like gambling. It is yourself to overcome the odds of the system. It is an implicit belief that although there is no guaranteed path, if I believe that I can find my own way, I will. Entrepreneurism is fuelling capitalism. Go to Guang Zhou, you see it for yourself if you are in China today, but entrepreneurism in terms of moving against social structure isn't familiar to Chinese people, and hasn't been, it always has taken continued place within a fairly regimented social structure.

Now, really this is a 1990's word, early 1990's. But this concept of being adrift boldly on a raft is not a concept that exists in the American capitalism. We don't have an equivalent translation of "下海". In fact, education, because of fundamentally different economic and social structures, is very different between capitalist societies and Confucian-day society. In Confucianism, education is just suggested, it's about mastery of fixed knowledge. Payoff comes from meticulous expertise, while meticulous means detail; expertise again mastery. It is static; it is deep; it is conceptual; it is beautiful; it is, however, static. Capitalism, on the other hand, depends on being able to analyse a new situation and to seize the opportunities. That's what education is. When the Western people take tests, they are weak and are the worst, for example, in America in the world, at math. Why is that? Because our education system isn't geared toward that. Our education system is geared more on a lateral, assimilative mode. The payoff is , as they say in Latin, anybody ever see the movie with Robin Williams? - "Seize the day!" I see an opportunity, and I'm going to catch it. It is dynamic, involving, and it implicitly recognizes that things never change. The Chinese government is now understanding that as well as it tries to reshape its curriculum for the colleges and high schools, but implicit in this is non-certainty - education cannot guarantee success today in China. That is why in just one poll on the Internet 75.43% - there is some quantitative support - suggests that the most important thing in success is a pioneering spirit, 1.3% say education; 2.39% say family background, 10.53% say opportunities, and 10.24% say the mind of a genius. This is to suggest that pioneering spirit is new ideal, and a new tool.

It also requests a little bit of uncertainty. Confucian society defines success on a singular pattern. The route to success is under a "no pain, no gain" belief, like working out, like going to the gym, like diet. I'm going to go to pain, but I know I will get muscles and I will lose weight. It is certain - if I suffer, if I command, I can win. Capitalism, on the other hand, is based on the individual. He shapes his own definition. Success route is based on high risk, high return, just like what you're learning from efficient capital market. But it is uncertain. It is not certain. Actually there is an uneasy marriage in the minds of men when they are approaching their master inside, between society's definition of success which is fairly rigid and the way he gets there which is broad and becoming increasingly more dynamic. Men today believe that they used to know the way but now ... success is who, whom? You've got a roof, you've got a mouth, you've got another mouth, you've got money, you've got field, you've got boost, you've got consumption of wealth. To get rich is glorious, that is the ideal, but how can I get there? DEng Xiaoping says crossing the river by feeling the stones. "摸著石頭過河。"Not so certain, is it? Crossing the river by feeling the stones - it's a trying period, it's risk-taking, it's a maze. So Chinese men today have a magnificent destination - they are freer, they have more choices, and they can grab the golden ring as they ever could before, but there is an unsure road. How do I get there? Now this is not to say that Chinese men are fearful. Chinese men are the most ambitious, aggressive men on the planet. They can move forward, the result was he was to fall anxiety. Chinese men have "焦慮".　焦慮不是怕的意思。焦慮是一個(gè)不明的、不舒服的感覺。It's not fear, it's like having a little rock in your shoe that never comes out. And ultimately, what marketers to do is help Chinese men manage this anxiety. Because today, Chinese men do not feel like they can control their destinies like what they could in the past. Today the payoff is brighter than ever, but the ability to control it is less in their control, less in their hands. And what you are going to be doing is having this master inside about the conflict between a rigid social definition of success and a lack of sureness if we're getting there into different advertising that had been used successfully in China in marketing to Chinese men.

So let us begin with the following six advertising themes. The first one is the most obvious - Project Status. 表現(xiàn)出地位。People have anxiety（焦慮）, so they have to, if they don't really have confidence, if they really are not sure of their social stature of their prestige, they have to display what they do have. They have to magnify what they do have and they have to feel bigger than perhaps they do inside. Now let's claim a few ways that, this is again the most basic marketing rule in Chinese men marketing - status. OK? There's not a lot of room for interpretation here. He has to be big, he has to be bold, he has to be bald. Let's see some public examples: first, 海王金樽 (video show) Why? OK? This is basically using all imperial imagery as status, very average advertising, but successful. The next is for Youngor Suits. Youngor Suits are just about looking elegant and having class, and it's ultimately based on creating something called the Youngor Man. Youngor, a note of course, he gets the girl, too. The final status commercial is for Virgin Airlines. What they are doing is a little bit more sophisticated but it's still status-based They have a little price premium, which was called aroma therapy. I don't know what aroma therapy is -- you smell it; then you get better. I don't know. But this is ultimately about if you have enough status, then we will offer you personalized service, service only for you. Here is Virgin Airlines (video show).

Anyhow, theme No. 2: give him tools. If a man is feeling a little bit helpless, he will need help, he will need an external aid to help him grab success, to extend his arm just a little bit, so that he can grab something that might be a little bit higher than what he can normally reach. One obvious way of doing this is confidence from boss approval, which will be an external aid. If the boss approves of me, I can go further, I can leverage my boss's endorsement of me. Now this of course can be true in any culture, but in China the idea of pleasing the boss takes on residence in advertising. Let's play an example of this - Rejoice Shampoo. Rejoice is all about confidence. It's about female confidence and it's about male confidence. But in this case, the man's soft and shiny hair makes him a better translator, and that makes him impress the boss with great hair - Commercial ends with handshake. We know that the guy with a soft and shiny hair is destined for a better tomorrow. Another tool is technology. Technology in China is not just about productivity, it is a weapon on business battlefield, is a military weapon and it helps you defeat enemies, competitors. Technology is ultimately about empowerment It's I've got something you don't have, I've got it done. Now, technology in Siemens mobile telephone commercial (video show). This is just about one example of GPRS interconnectivity. It enables you to get on the net, stay on the net. And of course, he too, at the end of the commercial, gets the girl. Now I promise you, we're going to talk more about getting the girl just a little bit later. Let's first go through this technology stuff, shall we? I'd like to show you something for fun, the Santana ads, the Santana car. This is a very, very direct technology as empowerment, but it's a very ugly embarrassing execution, just because your strategy is good doesn't mean that you can have execution like this. It's Car Man.

Theme No 3 - releasing aggression. Because society has regimentation, because there are not enough outlets for success, it's ultimately about money and the chances of getting there are not sure, man has repression. Chinese men tend to be a little bit repressed, that is they don't express their desire so openly. Sometimes they have to stand a little bit back and control the expression how they feel in their hearts, and control the power that they know they want. So when a man in advertising succeeds, he doesn't mean to merely succeed - he should succeed in romance. He should succeed with a spectacular victory that is at times larger than life. This would, of course, explain this - Kongfu. The most recent Kongfu movie was what - big one? "英雄"，張藝謀的"英雄"。What was it about? Emperor Qin, First Emperor Qin. Now this was a guy that was larger than life, this was a guy that basically reorder the entire universe of China and control it. He basically changed the direction of cultural rivers, brought it under his command, so it was no coincidence that this man was the central subject of a Kongfu movie. Because Kongfu is ultimately about the release of inner power, and it's about the control of inner power. In fact, what is Taiji? Taiji is based on not Confucianism but Taoism - Ba Gua, and ultimately, Taiji is replicating a prescribed order of nature. The movements of Taiji are circular, as is the order of nature. But we're getting in for another presentation on, so I'll go back to here-Kongfu. The point is that Kongfu is ultimately about the release of ambition. And here, for example, not just victory but spectacular victory is advertising for ADSL, Internet service, which isn't as fast as what it says it is, particularly at night. But anyway, it's there. The next commercial I'm going to play is a little less obvious. And that's for Motorola. Actually, I think that Motorola, which is one of our biggest client - motor, motor, motor - is a very successful male advertiser, very successful. And here is one of their ads I like the most, which is about karaoke. And ultimately, it's more abstract. It's about the fantasy of being bigger than you actually are, being able to express what you can't express. Now here's what we're going to get a little bit sensitive. And I'm saying this just in my own opinion and I don't want to say this too strongly. There is a difference between patriotism (愛國主義的)and nationalism (民族主義的). Patriotism is a simple love for country. Chinese of course are very patriotic as are most other nations. Nationalism has a little bit more - let's say in edge, a little bit more frustration with how the world sees you. Nationalism is about a country's role in the world. China is a relatively nationalistic society. Not just proud of China - When China to assume its rightful place as a world power. Nationalism is particularly strong in China amongst the younger generation - 18 to 34, just the liberated generation. Patriotism is strong everywhere - the taxi drivers, the grandfather, his 8-year-old kid. But nationalism is a particularly youthful phenomenon. And as soon as you crossed 35 years old, the tone of the discussion changes. The question is on this one why. Why are young people more nationalistic when the young people have the most freedom, have the most to be grateful to the country for opening themselves up to the rest of the world? We believe that it's due to - what we are talking about before - a certain repression, a certain frustration with not being able to necessarily achieve what you know in your heart in the world, a risk of not being able to quite get there. It's a displaced repression onto the national stage. That's why when we say, in a little bit feeling, China is great, am I great too? I'm Chinese. China is great, then I'm great. And this nationalism can be very effectively used in advertising, and it is one of the common aims China's greatness as a nation relative to the rest of the world. This is targeted exclusively at young people; nationalism does not work for older people, but patriotism does. The next commercial that I'm going to play is a Coke commercial where I believe this is Li Tie, soccer, OK, going out to a world tour, bringing China's glory everywhere. I want to say that this commercial would've never won in America. We have our own American glory despite our patriotic American desire. This is a Chinese commercial in the fullest sense of the word. Yao Ming, China Unicom, guess how much money China Unicom spends on his powerful advertisement? It spends 4.8 million RMB on this, on this endorsement. Why? Because Yao Ming is a national hero. China Unicom is the telecommunications company of the future. We're working with China Unicom right now to try to help them figure out a way to better use Yao Ming as more than just a nationalistic icon. But ultimately, it's working, and Still, it's got high awareness. Everybody knows that Yao Ming was associated with China Unicom. You can call into advertising even though he has no real relationship with the category. It's an artificial association, but nationalism can make it work sometimes.

Here comes a little bit for fun, OK? Help him pass the girl test. When we talk about love in China, women expect one thing, they want you to prove your love. They will not believe words, that's why we very rarely say "I love you" in China, even the younger generation. Men have to prove their reliability. This is because men, again, traditional role is to be a supplier, to be a provider for the family. And women expect that from a man. A Chinese marriage which is based on "美滿將來" -- as I said - has material, children and romance. It is not象美國等西方國家一樣，每天浪漫，它代表一個(gè)婚姻的幸福。我沒說在中國浪漫不是重要的，肯定它是很重要的，但它是一部分的，不代表核心, 33%, or something like that. So a man is feeling under pressure from his girl, from his wife. It starts as early as 16 years old. So what a marketer can do is help get the man back on top. Let's take a way of doing this, of getting the man in control of the situation with respect to the girl. And this is what we're ultimately talking about - taking the control away from the girl just a little bit, giving him leverage over her. The first commercial is Siemens. This is a very young persons' commercial, in which the feature is just a camera and the camera helps him impress the girl. Let's look. "Now you'll wait for me without complaining." It's like this commercial are saying, "I figure out a way." The next commercial is for slightly older people. These are people that are getting married, and I shot this commercial last year. This is about a man and a woman... the woman says, "oh, the moon is so romantic!" And what does the man do? He goes and gets her the moon, and at the same time comes out with a diamond ring - three months of the salary ... yes, big one too, proving his love. Romance and materialism fuse into one. Next is Deluxe. This is targeted to the American men, American family. Deluxe easy-wash paint. Basically, this is about a husband and a son. They're bad when the wife is away. They spill things but they find a way to get themselves out of trouble and keep the woman away. I think we're having the same problem. Speaking of wedding rings. These are just in figures. The penetration rate for diamond engagement rings for couples in households making over 5,000 RMB per month in Shanghai is 84% while seven years ago the penetration was 9%. The penetration in Japan is 61%. The average income of a Japanese man is 8 times more than an average Shanghai man. The wedding ring is playing a certain role here. In Beijing, which is of course not nearly as Westernized, 66% penetration. In Guangzhou, which is of course just like Hong Kong and they like gold and jade, 73%. The wedding ring is a prove of man's ability to provide for the woman in a way that isn't in other countries. A sub-theme is also to get him back on top, making him the master. At home, the man is at best a 50/50 partner. But outside the home it's a man's, man's world. Women, outside in public spaces, tend to be much more feminine. Take a look for example at the difference between United Airlines and American Airlines, where the waitresses and stewardesses are 96 years old, and their idea of good service is spilling the coffee on your shirt not on your pants. And they always yell at you, you know. I feel always guilty with that. Whereas on a Chinese airline, in a Chinese lounge room, in a Chinese massage parlour, which by the way do not exist in the West, despite what you have seen, despite what you might have heard or seen or in her movies, these massage parlours, these houses of beauty and cute, they are in the corners of our society in the West. In China, they're brightly lit up, multicoloured, with their menu of price lists right in the front window, right? You just multiply the normal massage price by 10 and then you get special service. So the sexualisation of women outside the house is extreme in Chinese society just as it is, by the way, in Japanese society. Let's play for example a commercial for Shick. We are not just talking about a guy attracting a woman; we're talking about a guy because of the sharp blaze which makes his face sharp and handsome - conquering the woman. Did the woman like the commercial more than the man for some reason?

Another sub-theme in terms of getting the man back on top and having his way with woman is using rules not muscles. Obviously the most intellectually challenging man in the continent, in the world. Is anybody here Australian? Our Australian men, when they want to impress a girl, what will they do? They all live by the beach, right? You know they are a few miles within the beach. So when they want to say, "I want to impress you", they take off their shirts and they say the beach is that way. They show up their muscles; they show up their bodies. In China, the body is not nearly as sexy as a sexy mind, since in China, because this is still a society that has barriers that need to be woven round, not barriers that need to be crashed, ruined. In China, the mind wins. So anything we can do to make the man seem smarter will be an attractive thing for his girl. Let's play a couple of commercials. Again, one Siemens targeted to younger people, and the goal is just simply to impress her with his intelligence. And it's no coincidence that when he uses his mind he is standing proudly like the Statue of Liberty. He is using his mind on this occasion. The next commercial is perhaps a little bit older, another good one - Motorola ads of using the mobile phone to romance the girl again but more sophisticated. Intelligence gets her. The next commercial is McDonald's, and this is for the engagement period. Wonderful McDonald's commercial. Look how he impresses her, and she is still not satisfied. Isn't that typical? Where are the chicken wings?

Another sub-theme here is to save his face with humour. If the man has a tough time pleasing the girl, if the girl or wife is giving him a lot of pressure, if he is going to feel just a little bit degraded, save his face with humour. He is not very successful with women, but he is able to, on the other hand, always project a smiling, happy, tongue in cheek, take-it-with-humour approach. Now let's play another television that uses the same approach of humour. to save face. Finally another good Motorola ad, and again, humour. To combat a very difficult girlfriend.

So that's the 4th theme of passing the girl test. The 5th theme is to leverage friendship. Now in China there 2 types of friendship. One is the friendship that goes back a long time, friendship for trust, for retreating it to trust. You can always trust that. These friendships are friends of hearts and there is an everlasting bond. And when time gets tough, the man is getting confused with all the changes that are going on around him, he knows he can depend on the friends of time-gone-by, the classmates, the college dormitory mates. Anybody that comes afterwards is not going to be the quite the same type of friends. Let's play the commercial that gets to the beautiful retreat into friendship that can always be counted on. This is a multi-generational friendship. It stood the test of time. Now the second type of friendship, and I realize this isn't exactly the friendliest word, but is "酒肉朋友". This is an untapped opportunity. I have not been able to find any commercials that leverage this dynamic. This basically assumes that if I haven't known you for a long time, I cannot trust you a hundred percent. But I need to be able to trust you, so that we can both move forward, so that we can both benefit. A beer - primary role, as you can see in advertising, is social lubrication, which means making friends - normal English. But ultimately it's about turning a situation which is not a hundred percent trustworthy into one that is trustworthy. And this is an opportunity waiting to happen - that the beer or the alcohol that recognizes the dynamics of contemporary friendship amongst men that don't go way back can make a lot of money. Sorry we couldn't find a commercial of this kind.

And finally, the 6th - making him an expert. As we have seen there is anxiety. There is a little bit of nervousness, again, it's not fear, only anxiety. So if he cannot be sure that he can succeed in business; if he cannot be 100% certain that his career will be successful, making him command, making him in command of non-business situations, so that in some areas of his life, he can say, "I am the best after all." This will explain, in my view, the Shanghai men in the kitchen. I wondered how can such a male-dominated historical Confucian culture ever accept men cooking in the kitchen and women not doing anything. Just kidding. The answer is because he is in command. He has his own domain. He is sharpening his expertise. We actually did focus groups on this very matter, so we get a little bit insight into how different people interpret control in a different way. And the most interesting folk that we found was, "I may not feel in charge in the living room, but in the kitchen, it's mine." Right? Or it can be sports - golf, golf as a command of the self … ability just as in the past, control of the mind. This is about control of one's own body in focusing concentration. And it is that reason why they are so addictive and it is that reason why they are spreading so quickly in China and not just amongst the money class. And of course, going back to the very beginning, culture is still a vibrant cultural value, a vibrant value of learned Chinese people and people that desire to have a modern life style. So command of culture can also work. Here are a couple of commercials that do this. The first one is physical mastery, and this is big impression - tea. It's a diet tea, making you in command of the sea. This is command of non-business situation. Nobody has a better body than him. Nobody skis as good as he does. That was you! And the final commercial that we're going to play is another expert. It's for SUNTORY beer - command of fishing, command of a sport. Please play. It's this big man. We're reaching our conclusion page. What we've basically hypothesized is that Chinese man today is a little bit torn between conflicts. Inside springs from conflict. On the one hand, he has a magnificent destination, he has opportunities that he has never had before and they represent a historic, heroic, bold breakthrough as we march into the 21st century. But on the other hand the world is not as sure as it is before, the result is a lingering - not fear, not passivity - but a lingering anxiety, a lack of complete certainty that he has what it takes to make it, because for the first time a pioneering spirit, an ability to seize new opportunities that passing in front of them is the hallmark of what makes a successful man. So marketers have an opportunity to relieve that tension. We've given you six ways.

One is the most basic - project status, make the man feel bigger than what he actually is by making him a badge, a badge of status. Second, give him tools, enable him to extend his reach a little bit beyond what he might normally be able to do all by himself, give him an external aid. Third, release his aggression. In a society with a narrow definition of success, however glorious, there is repression. So, let it all out. Let him not just have a victory, but let him have a spectacular and heroic victory. Next, help him pass the girl test. A man has responsibility. The responsibility of a man is to provide for the entire family -- the extended family, and as we saw - dead ancestors; the woman expects a lot, so give him some control with respect to the woman, help him feel that it is a 50/50 relationship, which sometimes he might not feel. Finally, the 5th, the leverage of friendship. If there is not certainty in that fast-changing outside world, help him retreat into the comforts of friendship and have your product associated with this security of friendship. The right type of friendship, because there is another type of friendship. And that is friendship that is utilitarian, that is useful. And in this case, the dynamic is take a little bit of lack a trust and make it 100% trustworthy. And finally, make him an expert. If he can't necessarily win all his dreams inside his career, help him become a master of that outside it. And that's all we have to say today for "the Mind of Chinese Men."

Thank you!

提問與回答

Q: I'm from Reeb Beer. How do you like it? Which category will you identify it to the success of commercial?

A: Well, frankly speaking, I don't know if I've seen the Reeb beer commercial that you're talking about. The Reeb commercial that I'm familiar with is the Shanghai commercials. Where do they fit in? I hate to say this, but they fit in on the nationalism slide. OK? Because all that the Reeb Beer is doing, and frankly I think it's very 表面的。不好意思，They are trying to associate a great city with a great man. All right. You're Shanghainese, so you're great. Just in the same way that nationalism works but of course, it is on a much narrow level. There is nowhere more to go. This could be any product. There is nothing inherent about the beer figure. It's working like Yao Ming, there is no beer in Reeb. I think that they can integrate the role of a product much more effectively. But as it stands, I wonder what they are going to do next, because the product is missing.

Q: Can you do a slight comparison between Western guys and Chinese guys?

A: Sure, Western guys are 笨; Chinese guys are smart, all right?

Q: I am sure there are more than that, for example like status, or ...

A: Let me just say we're all human beings. OK? Status is important to everybody; success is important to everybody; money is important to everybody. But different societies have different centres of gravity. Let me talk just a little bit about Western society. May I? Western society is rooted in what we call monotheism - believe in one god. Our god is different from your gods. 我是無神論者，但這個(gè)是我們的歷史影響。Monotheism is my relationship as an individual with the all power. I have a relationship with God, it's a 2-way dialogue. Abraham, Yitzhak, Moses, Jacob, Jesus - Jesus was God, OK? But they all act in a relationship with god; and in that relationship, if the individual accepts god into the heart - the moral code of god into the heart - the individual is able to change his destiny, and not just change his destiny, but possibly change society's destiny. Judaism, the first monotheist religion, is about the ability to create a heaven on earth because of my relationship with god. So the value of the individual is dipped right into the religion. As a result, in the West, what we call simple institutions designed to protect the right of the individual have developed. The Bill of Rights, Congress, the Magna Charta, Parliament - these are all laws designed to protect not government interests but individual interests. This is not to say that all politicians in the West are honest, of course not, but the system is designed to protect the rights of the individual and balance the individual's rights v.s. society's rights. So, as a result - now we're getting more to the point, right? - there is more of a focus on individualism in the West. Because of civil institutions, there is a sense that society is safe. And that I can bounce around a little bit; I can express myself a little bit. Because society has padded walls, even if I fall, it will be OK, so the individual can experiment, not just because he is protected, but because of his view of society as a protection.

In China, it's different. In China we believe that society is relatively fragile. We believe that we have high periods and low periods. Society goes in cycles, just like Taiji, up and down, gets better and worse. So things aren't safe; the outside world can't be dependent on. Society is fragile. I'm walking in a glass palace, that's why values such as balance, cleverness, conformity coexist uncomfortably sometimes with aggression and forward movement. So to answer your question, because of a monotheistic base, the Western man has a centre of gravity that is more rooted in individual right and individual capability. He can define success on a much, much, much broader platform. If I'm happy, I'm a success. Of course, it's not a hundred percent or zero percent. 但一般說是這樣的。我二哥，就很成功;我的大哥是一位副市長, but my little brother is a cook, and he is happy. He's still happy and he is so satisfied with being able to define himself.

Q: You talked about 6 themes. But you know, as China is developing with the world, maybe faster every year, so China is now not only attracting more capital from the world. Also, China is beginning a new strategy to invest more in foreign countries. So that will be inevitable in future that Chinese manufacturers will not only market their products within China but also in Europe, America and other countries. So would you like to give some suggestions on our future promotion activities, including commercials in Western countries?

A: Yes, I can give you some advice in a short sentence, OK? Oh, sorry, I didn't mean to make fun of you. This is not about men, this is about how to market abroad. Chinese companies have to understand the difference between products and brands. Chinese manufacturers have to start inside to develop brands. What is a brand? A brand is not awareness; a brand is not a commodity; a brand is not 我是中國最厲害的！That's not a brand. A brand is a relationship with the consumer that is really with the consumer inside. As soon as China begins to develop a brand, it can charge a premium. And then it can get to export something that has a quality perception that goes beyond reliability. Reliability is what小天鵝has as a household washing machine. Nobody thinks 小天鵝is my life partner.小天鵝is an OK washing machine that won't break down and I have a warranty. So China has to de-commoditize itself by understanding the difference between a brand and a product. And that is rooted in the inside. That is rooted in this. So as soon as the enterprises of China really understand this and restructure their organizations to develop brands -because it's not just a religious conversion, it's structural organization - then they can make progress with brands. You have to export brands. Until then, they will be exporting brandless tennis shoes to world market, or computer, or whatever, but they won't be brands. So, create brands.

Q: You define Chinese population as the youth, the old, the woman and the middle class, don't you? how do we differentiate men from the middle class?

A: Well, there are also old people. But I haven't got there. I, basically, define Chinese society in 5 segments. The youth - the people between 18-34, or 16-34; women; the new woman, the urban woman; the urban man; and then the middle class, what you either call "中產(chǎn)" or "小康", depending whether you want to be politically correct or not. I'll give you one sentence summary of middle class, if you don't mind. The middle class is about how people choose between 2 fundamental needs. They have to be balanced. So the conflict between the middle class is between projection表現(xiàn)出自我保護(hù)，他們在所有中產(chǎn)的人心里存在. They exist between in all middle class people. Because they still don't have a lot of money, but they have enough money to help them make consumer choices, so you have to choose between these 2 urges. And then marketers help reconcile those urges. The middle class is about how to make a man feel more control. I mean a man. It's about how to make him feel more control, less anxiety.

Q: I have 2 questions. The first is: what are the general principles you use to measure whether an ad is effective or not? The second question is that for marketing people what suggestions you have to help them to build a strong connection with the actual product, with the core product.

A: The first question is how do you define the success of an ad? Not how do you measure? We can talk forever on "how do you measure", but it's a research question. But a successful ad has 3 things - you can call it A, B, C. One, it has to create awareness; it has to be seen and remembered. Two, it needs to be branded, that means the ad has to be associated with your product. And three, it needs to communicate what you want it to communicate. If I want to say my car is the most elegant design, then an ad should communicate that. If all these things are working together, it should result in something called persuasion, while you change people's opinions about your brand and you need to increase purchase intent. This is a very complicated question, but you can easily tell what a good ad is and what a bad ad is once you see it working in market places. So, you should be measuring your advertisements, but different ads need different measure, and I don't want to go much further. You can say, "Oh, we're王牌, we're TCL, and we're the creators of a better tomorrow for the Chinese family. We're innovative, we're trustworthy, blab blab" The corporate ad has two goals. The first goal is to please the investment community. I'm not joking. This is what we call the "billboard near the airport", so that the investors are coming on a plane and see the billboard. Consumers don't care what the billboard says, but the investor community says, "Oh, they're advertising." That's one reason. It might be a waste of money; it might not be a waste of money. In China, because you have a history of state-owned enterprises with goods that are not reliable, Chinese people don't necessarily trust the basic quality of a brand. Chinese in general believe, that the bigger the corporation the better. The bigger the scale the more reliable its products will probably be. That's why you can have a company like Chunlan, and it can produce everything from air conditioners, to refrigerators, to motorcycles, to trucks, to engines. Because it's a big brand. So corporate advertising, just as general ad does in the United States is to design to have product reliability taken away by consumers. Reliability. But reliability is a very shallow base on which to build loyalty. Corporate advertising is usually, usually 90% of the time, waste of money.

Q: From my point of view, there are basically 2 category of advertising. The first one is the functional appealing; and the second one is the emotional appealing. Just now, you showed the ads are all, I think, fit into the emotional appealing. But now in China a lot of ads are only in functional appealing, and they succeed and sell the product. How do you see this?

A: Sometimes functionality works; sometimes functionality isn't enough, it depends on the product category. I don't have a lot of functional ads here is for 2 reasons: One, because you usually have based on insides, which tend to be less long-term effective when you don't have an inside. And secondly, emotional ads and functional ads are not mutually exclusive. Function can reinforce the emotion, and the emotion can reinforce the function. Siemens, for example, has lots of functionality in, but it has what we call a payoff. Sophie! We spent 15 seconds there on what we call the demo: why there is no side leakage, why you can turn around at night and not have any spillage - ah! It's awful! But you always end with a payoff of that "I'm confident to achieve tomorrow." So the division between function and emotion is artificial. They work hand in hand, and what we were talking about is the weight of each, No. 1. No. 2. If you're telling me that there're a lot of successful Chinese ads that just talk about the product and have nothing to do with the consumer inside for motivation, I'll show you a product that I can come and take away tomorrow. I can just defeat it like that. So, show me this after somebody does good communications with a good marketing strategy. Right now the landscape of China advertising is mostly heroic, functional which is why it is so easy right now to win in China from an advertising perspective because so few people do it well.

Q: In last year's speech, you said that women are complicated; men are much simpler. Do you mean that women want more than men in today's speech?

A: I still maintain that woman's primary challenge is balance, balance of different ideals - balance of a woman as a achiever, balance of a woman as a soft and kind mother, balance of a woman who pays attention to her own needs individually defined. Men don't have this identity issue. Men, it's a question of anxiety whereas women are balancing. Men, sort of go deep in terms of how to deal with something that they never feel comfortable about. Women are, in China, more comfortable than men, all right? But men have a heart to burden; women have a heart to balance.

Q: How to avoid overuse of confidence? And how to approach some segments that may not use such kinds of successful approach, for example, the older generations?

A: How to avoid overuse of overconfidence? Well, I'm not saying use confidence, you know, like a lot of butter spread on the bread, but I'll answer the question by saying, if you have an inside, and if you have a product uniqueness, you put them together, you come out with a brand identity and then an advertising strategy, you never overdo it, because you never forget about the product. It's not just about inside; it's about inside married with the product and how the product helps the inside and how the inside helps the product. So, don't forget about the product. Don't just go and go with an inside, because a brand vision is a fusion of product and inside. For the old people. Frankly speaking, older people - by older people, I mean older than 42, 43. These people had a hard life, and they're not nearly as interested in all the subjects that we're talking about. So I really agree with you that for older people, they want the information, they want it practical, they want it useful. That's why it's so much about medicine. When you're still younger, it's not like that. So there's a huge difference between young and old in terms of interests and all these stuff, frankly speaking. So help them get through the day a little bit more easily and began with it.

Q: I think what a family wish from a man, or what a friend wish from a man is not only he is an expert, or whether he is aggression. It is whether he is responsible. So how can you utilize these during the advertising, to promote the company, the culture or the product?

A: Well, the fact is you don't just use something. You don't say, "OK, here is something." You never forget about the product, OK? Let's resist the temptation to think that one of these things can just be taken off from this presentation, put on a beer can label and then just used, right? You'll have to start from the product and the role of the product in the men's life and then see whether any of the stuff is relevant to what you're thinking. Therefore inside is the primary phrase, but it doesn't automatically lead to a successful ad. I know that that seems basic and I don't have an answer to how you just use an inside. It comes from the product.

Q: If you're invited to create a commercial for CEIBS admission to attract the man graduates to apply for CEIBS next year, among your 6 tools, which one would you choose first and why?

A: The answer is obvious. Number 2 - give him tools, let him have a tool. This is a course that understands what success is, what makes success, that it is new style of education that teaches people to integrate what's happening around them in a new way so that they can just not spot opportunities from behind but coming. That's what I would do. And I would spend so much on the production project, and I would have it filmed in Paris, France.

走出別人的戰(zhàn)略---恒源祥品牌經(jīng)營之道

（根據(jù)錄音整理并翻譯，ＧＥ和ＣＥＩＢＳ版權(quán)所有。如需轉(zhuǎn)載，必須先與ＣＥＩＢＳ市場及公共關(guān)系部取得聯(lián)系。）

劉瑞旗 [簡介]

恒源祥（集團(tuán)）有限公司董事長、總經(jīng)理

2003年7月9日

我先問大家，今年或者上一個(gè)年度穿過手編毛衣的請舉手（兩個(gè)）。會(huì)編毛衣的請舉手（一位）。我們開始是一個(gè)毛線商店，我們沒有其他選擇，只能做一個(gè)手編毛衣，但現(xiàn)在都沒有人穿，也沒有人編了。是不是手編毛線檔次不夠？不是的，大家都知道，在國外手編毛衣賣得很貴。

我是在1987年1月1號到恒源祥商店當(dāng)總經(jīng)理的，那時(shí)候固定資產(chǎn)大概是五十萬。到1992年我們經(jīng)過資產(chǎn)評估達(dá)到102萬，五年時(shí)間翻了一番。1993年，恒源祥國有商店并入到上海萬象集團(tuán)股份有限公司，作為一個(gè)上市公司里面的資產(chǎn)合在一塊上市，成為一個(gè)全資子公司，那時(shí)候的資產(chǎn)擴(kuò)大評估，因?yàn)橐獪愇迩�萬上市，所以我們評估出來的293萬進(jìn)去了。從那天開始，恒源祥所有的經(jīng)營利潤都要按照全資的概念全部上交，自己失去資本增長和積累的過程。因此我們雖然已經(jīng)淘到第一桶金，但仍然以每年293萬的資產(chǎn)進(jìn)行經(jīng)營，把產(chǎn)生的利潤全都上交，一直到2000年。2001年，恒源祥這樣一個(gè)小商店，經(jīng)過我們努力，把品牌做起來以后，由于國有資產(chǎn)的出讓問題，我們就離開恒源祥，對恒源祥進(jìn)行再收購，花了很大的代價(jià)。恒源祥就是通過這樣一種經(jīng)歷過來的。

恒源祥憑什么？談到這個(gè)我就記起自己小時(shí)候淘第一桶金的經(jīng)歷。記得在我讀小學(xué)三年級的時(shí)候，那年代還是計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代，母親每個(gè)月給我一毛錢，讓我去到理發(fā)店理發(fā)。但當(dāng)時(shí)弄堂里面，也有揚(yáng)州師傅上門理發(fā)，他來推銷，他說你九分理不理？因?yàn)槔戆l(fā)店里可以洗頭，在弄堂里不能給你洗頭，因?yàn)椴荒軒�水過來，所以就九分。有了這樣一個(gè)賺一分錢的機(jī)會(huì)以后，我就賺了第二筆錢，第二次我是召集了五個(gè)小孩子，加我六個(gè)，一起跟理發(fā)師說八分理不理？他說OK，理了。我那時(shí)候就賺到了第一筆錢。這個(gè)模式跟恒源祥以后發(fā)展有關(guān)系。

我們來看一下恒源祥的歷史。恒源祥于1927年創(chuàng)立，原來的創(chuàng)立者在洋行里做事，自己賺了一點(diǎn)錢以后，就開了一個(gè)恒源祥人造絲毛線商店，最早開在福州路一個(gè)弄堂小店，由于他的努力勤奮，資本很快增長，1935年搬到了金陵路。他比較熟悉洋行里面的業(yè)務(wù)，懂得進(jìn)出口貿(mào)易，所以他的業(yè)務(wù)很快得到和較大的發(fā)展，也因此有了在1936年創(chuàng)辦的第一個(gè)毛紡工廠--玉民毛紡廠，解放以后改為國毛第七廠，那時(shí)候恒源祥已經(jīng)擁有7個(gè)工廠，3個(gè)店鋪。1956年恒源祥成為上海第一家自發(fā)參加公私合營的企業(yè)，所有的工廠歸入到紡織局毛紡系統(tǒng)。那時(shí)候絨線被我們國家列為計(jì)劃商品，是二類。一類是油鹽糧，毛線是二類商品。文化大革命的時(shí)候改為大海毛線商店，到1978年的時(shí)候才恢復(fù)過來，但恒源祥這時(shí)候開始慢慢沉睡。我去恒源祥的時(shí)候，也對恒源祥的歷史、現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了不少了解。假設(shè)當(dāng)時(shí)我們在這個(gè)商店的基礎(chǔ)上努力加強(qiáng)商店的經(jīng)營管理，努力提高商店員工的管理水平，努力改善貨源供應(yīng)，恒源祥今天的結(jié)果是什么呢？是滅亡。因?yàn)閾?jù)歷史記載，1956年的時(shí)候，上海有名有姓的毛線商店超過200家，到今天我們還能記得真正有名有姓的毛線商店沒有了。恒源祥如果跟他們一樣，今天也不存在了。1998年，我們考慮把“恒源祥”三個(gè)字作為商標(biāo)注冊下來。當(dāng)時(shí)對商標(biāo)沒有很深的認(rèn)識，因?yàn)槲覀儑�家的商�?biāo)法是在1982年開始實(shí)施的，自己對商標(biāo)還不是很熟悉。所以我們當(dāng)時(shí)就把它當(dāng)作一個(gè)標(biāo)識，叫美工畫一個(gè)東西，到工商局去。工商局搞商標(biāo)登記的跟我說，你"恒源祥"就是一個(gè)很好的擁有社會(huì)資源、并且擁有含金量的品牌，所以就把"恒源祥"三個(gè)字注冊下來當(dāng)商標(biāo)。然后是等待時(shí)機(jī)。到了1991年我們才找到了合作伙伴。為什么有了商標(biāo)以后很長時(shí)間沒有找到合作伙伴呢？我們做了很多努力，當(dāng)時(shí)我們找過很多好的企業(yè)，大型的國有企業(yè)，但因?yàn)殚T不當(dāng)戶不對，沒有人愿意跟我們合作；有些大工廠有自己的品牌，怎么可能幫你恒源祥做？我們也做過一些嘗試，但合作都不長久。后來我們經(jīng)過努力，總算找到了一家算是門當(dāng)戶對的工廠--一個(gè)村辦小企業(yè)，就幾十個(gè)工人，六百個(gè)紡錠。記得我第一次去這個(gè)工廠時(shí)，考察也好，視察也好，他們用村里最好的交通工具手扶拖拉機(jī)，上面放個(gè)藤椅來接我。合作的時(shí)候我們什么都不懂，技術(shù)也不行，什么都沒有，但我們選擇了一個(gè)高質(zhì)量的產(chǎn)品。當(dāng)時(shí)的關(guān)鍵是講利潤分配。我們就口頭講了一句，說“我們現(xiàn)在把這個(gè)毛線生產(chǎn)出來，大家共同努力去賣，賺來的利潤一人一半”。這個(gè)概念一直延續(xù)到今天，還是講賺來的錢一人一半，永遠(yuǎn)不結(jié)帳，你拿了多了你欠我的，我拿的多了我欠你的。當(dāng)然在這個(gè)運(yùn)行當(dāng)中會(huì)碰上很多阻力，時(shí)間關(guān)系就不一一列舉了。

恒源祥為什么會(huì)成功呢？

當(dāng)時(shí)我們的方法很簡單，但運(yùn)行起來有一點(diǎn)難度。一般情況下，當(dāng)一家毛線工廠經(jīng)過運(yùn)行生意好了，就會(huì)增加設(shè)備，增加資金投入，繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大銷售。我們沒有選擇這樣的方法。1992年，我們?nèi)�尋找第二、第三、第四家工廠，找了四個(gè)工廠共同生產(chǎn)手編毛線，并且要求每一個(gè)工廠按照要求做一個(gè)產(chǎn)品。假如說我們總共有四個(gè)產(chǎn)品，每個(gè)工廠同時(shí)要生產(chǎn)四個(gè)產(chǎn)品的話，他在備料、生產(chǎn)成本、生產(chǎn)周期、庫存商品量等方面都會(huì)很大，所以我們每個(gè)工廠只生產(chǎn)一個(gè)產(chǎn)品。原來每一個(gè)工廠進(jìn)入市場都要派人到全國市場去銷售，造成資源的浪費(fèi)。四個(gè)工廠進(jìn)行合作以后，形成四個(gè)工廠專業(yè)化的生產(chǎn)，機(jī)器設(shè)備從年初一做到晚上就做這四個(gè)產(chǎn)品；然后我們劃分四個(gè)區(qū)域，把他們的產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行相互貿(mào)易補(bǔ)償，你給我，我給你，把貨合在一起到一個(gè)地區(qū)去做。這樣的成本就會(huì)大幅度下降。恒源祥怎么賺錢？我們不是品牌，字號剛剛開始運(yùn)行。當(dāng)時(shí)我們有四個(gè)工廠，假如說每個(gè)工廠在市場運(yùn)行都需要用一千萬廣告費(fèi)，市場走就是四千萬人民幣，但對每一個(gè)企業(yè)他所得到的回報(bào)還是一千萬，因?yàn)樗�自己做自己的品牌，現(xiàn)在四個(gè)工廠都跟恒源祥進(jìn)行合作了，他們把這一千萬全都交給恒源祥公司，恒源祥用三千萬去做廣告。但對于單個(gè)工廠來說，用了一個(gè)三千萬的品牌就相當(dāng)于賺了兩千萬，虛擬的兩千萬。我們的利潤就這樣產(chǎn)生了。所以說關(guān)鍵在于你有沒有能力讓大家一塊跟你做。但到今天如果還按照這個(gè)模式做的話，有一點(diǎn)難度，因?yàn)槲覀儸F(xiàn)在在產(chǎn)品延展過程中碰到一些問題。

接下來我想跟大家分享一下我們在廣告和營銷上面一些比較獨(dú)特的案例，因?yàn)楹阍聪橐恢痹谥袊鴦?chuàng)造一些人家不太可能想象到的事情。

恒源祥的成功，有人說是靠廣告。沒有廣告能成功嗎？我認(rèn)為“酒香也怕巷子深，也得吆喝”，但如果認(rèn)為僅僅做廣告能夠解決問題的話，中國估計(jì)就沒有不好的企業(yè)，世界上也沒有不好的企業(yè)。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)，70％的廣告投入都是浪費(fèi)掉的，我們盡量不要進(jìn)入到70％浪費(fèi)的行列中去，否則錢就會(huì)白花。1991年產(chǎn)品剛剛出來的時(shí)候，銷路并不好，因?yàn)槭呛阍聪樵瓉硎巧痰辏�你的制造商名稱寫上恒源祥絨線商店有人要嗎？消費(fèi)者認(rèn)為不是你生產(chǎn)的，質(zhì)量無法保證。當(dāng)時(shí)我們就做了一個(gè)“手腳”，在印刷的時(shí)候把商店兩個(gè)字給“漏掉”了。然后我們就去做廣告，可當(dāng)時(shí)沒有錢。一個(gè)小商店就一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)資金，每年的利潤也就是幾十萬，還不夠用的，再說當(dāng)時(shí)對廣告管理的也比較嚴(yán)格，不過我們還是咬咬牙去做了。我拿了十萬人民幣到上海電視臺聯(lián)系廣告。十萬對恒源祥小商店來說是非常大的錢了，可電視臺說十萬塊錢能做幾次廣告呀，當(dāng)時(shí)電視廣告都是15秒一個(gè)單位的，我沒有辦法，說做5秒一個(gè)可以嗎？他說不可以，最少15秒；我就跟他們磨，我說這樣吧，我在四點(diǎn)的時(shí)候播5秒，五點(diǎn)播5秒，八點(diǎn)播5秒。他們認(rèn)為也可以。我們就說了兩遍恒源祥，恒源祥毛線，其他什么都不說。三個(gè)五秒加起來有六遍恒源祥，我們就是用這個(gè)方法讓人們記住恒源祥的品牌，深刻的記憶是大有好處的。當(dāng)時(shí)中國第一次播放電視劇《婉君》，我們也用同樣的方法買下一個(gè)15秒的廣告，我在第一集電視劇結(jié)束的時(shí)候播5秒，在廣告播一分鐘的時(shí)候播5秒，第二集開始的時(shí)候又播5秒，說了六遍恒源祥。后來有人說總共兩分鐘的廣告，人們除了恒源祥，沒記住其他的。 我們的廣告就這樣開始進(jìn)入市場，并且在中國首創(chuàng)了5秒的標(biāo)牌廣告。1993年，恒源祥到中央電視臺打廣告，當(dāng)時(shí)我想做6秒，中央電視臺沒有，談判沒有成功，但是也同意我們15秒連播三遍廣告，那是中央臺第一次產(chǎn)生連播三遍5秒的電視廣告。其實(shí)品牌廣告的原則很簡單，不要太長，廣告一長人們就記不住。我們在上海最早做的時(shí)候是用了"羊發(fā)財(cái)"，因?yàn)?發(fā)羊財(cái)"很俗氣，就用"羊發(fā)財(cái)"。這個(gè)片子在中央臺審片的時(shí)候沒有通過，因?yàn)槲覀冞@個(gè)片子太簡單。當(dāng)時(shí)我們用紙剪了三個(gè)字，放在紙板上，攝像機(jī)吊在話筒上，攝像機(jī)搖動(dòng)，用土方法做上去的，到了中央臺這樣的廣告片是肯定不行的。把它改掉？可我沒有錢做好的廣告。第二天又去談判，我們問"恒源祥羊發(fā)財(cái)"廣告不能播，是不是因?yàn)檠蚴莿?dòng)物不能發(fā)財(cái)，他們說是。那我們現(xiàn)在改成“發(fā)羊財(cái)”，應(yīng)該可以吧。就這么通過了，最后播的時(shí)候，第一遍是“發(fā)發(fā)發(fā)”，第二遍是“羊羊羊”，第三遍是“財(cái)財(cái)財(cái)”。有領(lǐng)導(dǎo)覺得還是不好，沒有辦法，就只用上“恒源祥羊羊羊”。這個(gè)播完以后就碰上問題了，中央電視臺10月份出了一個(gè)通知，將在1994年11月2號對1995年的黃金時(shí)段拿出來進(jìn)行拍賣，他是把一分鐘廣告分成12個(gè)五秒，原來是15秒沒有5秒；同時(shí)規(guī)定任何企業(yè)做15秒廣告要加收60％的費(fèi)用，因?yàn)橐�保障�?秒廣告的拍賣成功。那一年中央電視臺五秒廣告的價(jià)格甚至超過1994年15秒的價(jià)格。后來廣告界朋友跟我講，說我們幫中央臺開了一條財(cái)路。不過回頭來講，我們當(dāng)時(shí)選5秒廣告所得到的效益在以后的市場時(shí)間當(dāng)中得到了充分的證明，其實(shí)我們是節(jié)省了成本。當(dāng)時(shí)廣告的聲音打動(dòng)了老人、小孩子的心。1996年，我們的五秒廣告合同結(jié)束，之后分季節(jié)性，淡季不播。后來收到沈陽氣象局的一位家長寫來一封信，他問為什么停播這個(gè)廣告，應(yīng)該馬上恢復(fù)，說他們家里有一個(gè)2個(gè)月的孩子，每天晚上都是伴著“羊羊羊”入睡的，如果看不到廣告孩子就天天鬧，不睡覺。我們后來就寄了一盤錄像帶給他，我告訴他去買一臺錄像機(jī)看。這樣的案例還有很多。 我們仔細(xì)分析一下，中國90％的廣告都是產(chǎn)品廣告，品牌類的廣告很少，幾乎沒有。產(chǎn)品廣告是跟著產(chǎn)品走的。隨著產(chǎn)品的成長而成長，隨著產(chǎn)品的衰退而衰退，隨著產(chǎn)品的死亡而死亡。恒源祥就是從開始扔掉絨線羊毛衫以后慢慢走過來的，所以我們以前的錢沒有白扔，沒有浪費(fèi)。我們廣告是從這個(gè)角度入手的，是這個(gè)方法讓我們?nèi)〉贸晒�，但這并不是唯一的方法，也不是最好的方法。問題是怎么用最少的錢達(dá)到這個(gè)目標(biāo)。其實(shí)我們做廣告就是應(yīng)該突破渠道。

1995年我隨中國毛紡代表團(tuán)到阿根廷訪問，突發(fā)奇想，想請馬拉多納到中國來踢球。我們?nèi)珯?quán)委托了一個(gè)人去談這件事，到后來就促成馬拉多納1996年7月出訪中國的事情。我們的想法是能夠爭取在比賽結(jié)束時(shí)讓我給馬拉多納頒發(fā)獎(jiǎng)杯，但他如果不是隊(duì)長怎么辦？那就讓他上場，還要成為最佳隊(duì)員，怎樣才能在運(yùn)動(dòng)員上場比賽以前，讓他的精神狀態(tài)調(diào)整到最好的狀態(tài)？后來我們策劃了三個(gè)點(diǎn)子。第一，他可以在入住的錦江賓館里面買東西不付錢，因?yàn)槿思宜湍銝|西，跟你買東西不付錢概念不一樣，心情也會(huì)不一樣。他一聽就很高興，后來就到商場里面不付錢挑東西。第二，讓他做從來沒有做過的事情，到后來騎三輪車，從來沒有騎過。成都有三輪車，就讓他騎三輪車吧，這可是從來沒有過的，教練坐在后面，公安局找了四個(gè)保鏢，很多球迷追隨，這個(gè)事也開心。第三件事難度比較大。因?yàn)榻?jīng)紀(jì)人說馬拉多納喜歡女孩子，這在中國肯定不行。后來我們找了十個(gè)模特小姐，每人穿一件印著馬拉多納的T恤衫，拿一個(gè)足球站成一排。馬拉多納出來以后，我們就說在中國有很多你忠實(shí)的球迷，他們都希望你在足球上給他們簽字，我們選了一些代表，每簽一個(gè)字還可以在小姐的臉上吻一下。他很激動(dòng)，也很開心，明星都這樣。第二天的比賽，他上場90分鐘，雖然沒有進(jìn)球但是非常賣力，所以我就成了中國唯一一個(gè)為馬拉多納發(fā)過獎(jiǎng)杯的企業(yè)家。這是一個(gè)笑話，但這也是一個(gè)思路，我們也只策劃了這么一個(gè)事件，當(dāng)時(shí)四川、成都、有線三個(gè)電視臺同時(shí)實(shí)況轉(zhuǎn)播，這在成都也是史無前例的。整個(gè)活動(dòng)花了約一百萬人民幣，促成了一件人們看著不可能的事。

我們說過現(xiàn)在很少有人穿手編毛衣，那恒源祥豈不還是死路一條？不管怎么樣，我們既然選擇了這個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)，至少要去維持它的生命；其實(shí)任何企業(yè)都不是在煥發(fā)它的青春，都是在維持它的生命，只要生命存在，只要能永續(xù)下去就會(huì)成功。如果連生命都維持不住，就更不要提什么發(fā)展了。所以我們就策劃如何去推動(dòng)這個(gè)手編毛線。 我們要發(fā)動(dòng)人們?nèi)ゾ幟�線。當(dāng)然不可能讓在座的你們?nèi)ゾ�，你們沒這個(gè)時(shí)間，也沒有價(jià)值。我們開始細(xì)分市場，找老年人，退休以后沒什么事情，可以讓他們?nèi)ゾ�。我們開了一個(gè)課題，絨線編織與老年癡呆癥防治的課程，上海黃埔區(qū)一個(gè)老年干部大學(xué)，他們就開設(shè)了一們編織課。我們這個(gè)項(xiàng)目以后會(huì)不斷地深入、推廣下去。我們的另一個(gè)細(xì)分市場是小孩子。小孩子讀書那么忙，怎么編？我們又開發(fā)了一個(gè)課題，叫做絨線編織與少年兒童智力開發(fā)的科學(xué)研究。手指運(yùn)動(dòng)跟智力開發(fā)有關(guān)系，為什么左撇子都特別聰明？因?yàn)樗�左右開弓。當(dāng)時(shí)我們找了250個(gè)學(xué)生來參與編織，然后又請了一些專門的心理學(xué)家進(jìn)行研究，課題做了兩年，成果還不是很大。在此期間我們還把這個(gè)項(xiàng)目報(bào)到國家教育部，請教育部立項(xiàng)，教育部批下來以后，就成了我們國家“九五”期間重大的教育科技改革項(xiàng)目。但因?yàn)槲覀兒髞砉�司有很多變革，這個(gè)項(xiàng)目沒能繼續(xù)做下去，大家有興趣的話，以后還可以一塊做。我們當(dāng)時(shí)就是希望通過教委下文，在大學(xué)、中學(xué)、小學(xué)里面開設(shè)編織這門課程，來達(dá)到推廣編織毛線的目的，這樣就不擔(dān)心沒有人編了。我們的方法就是尋找除了飽暖和漂亮之外，編織是不是還有其他功能？有。它是一種手指的運(yùn)動(dòng)，是兩個(gè)手的運(yùn)動(dòng)，手、腦、眼并用，對智力開發(fā)非常有好處。所以手指運(yùn)動(dòng)對人的身體健康也是非常有好處。既然是手指運(yùn)動(dòng)，我們可以把它當(dāng)成運(yùn)動(dòng)項(xiàng)目來開展；既然能夠當(dāng)運(yùn)動(dòng)項(xiàng)目開展，國家能不能批準(zhǔn)作為全運(yùn)會(huì)的項(xiàng)目；既然我們國家能批準(zhǔn)，將來有沒有可能成為奧運(yùn)會(huì)的項(xiàng)目？有人說搞營銷的人就是胡思亂想，但你必須想，有可能做不到，但沒想是肯定做不到的。我把以前的體育總局局長伍紹祖請到公司來跟他談編織，他說我七歲的時(shí)候就學(xué)編織毛線，在延安編過很多東西，如果不相信馬上拿東西來，我們馬上拿了毛線、針給他，他也就當(dāng)場打給我們看。他還說絨線編織是非常好的全民健身項(xiàng)目，如果你們公司有興趣，可以把它當(dāng)做建設(shè)項(xiàng)目來開展，他會(huì)全力支持。那么奧運(yùn)會(huì)項(xiàng)目呢？薩馬蘭奇見過嗎？你們肯定會(huì)問。不過我還真的見過。1997年5月22號我見了他，跟他談我們要經(jīng)過努力，把絨線編織變成將來的奧運(yùn)會(huì)項(xiàng)目。他沒有說什么，只是捧著肚子大笑，他可能在笑我這個(gè)人是不是腦子有毛病。其實(shí)營銷也就這么回事，只要有價(jià)值一定會(huì)成為人們喜聞樂見，大家愿意去干的事。這樣一來，是不是手編毛線是不是又多了一個(gè)新的用途？運(yùn)動(dòng)器材！這樣手編毛線就又能多銷一點(diǎn)。我們還搞了一個(gè)編織擂臺，現(xiàn)在我們35分16秒編織一件毛衣的記錄還沒有人打破。有誰打破這個(gè)記錄，就可以拿到一百萬獎(jiǎng)金。

以上談的是我們公司在營銷方面的一些動(dòng)作，接下來講我們另外的一個(gè)成功因素，選擇一個(gè)好的品牌，號的名字，因?yàn)橛行┟�字是做不大的。恒源祥的每一個(gè)字打開來都有很好的含義，合在一起，恒源祥三個(gè)字是沒有什么意思的，因此這樣的商標(biāo)具有非常強(qiáng)烈的個(gè)性和顯著性，不太容易和其他品牌產(chǎn)生雷同，在市場發(fā)展上的空間比較大。我們知道松下電器用以前的英文商標(biāo)向全球進(jìn)軍的時(shí)候，到英語國家就不行，因?yàn)榉�譯過來是民族的意思。我們國家就有規(guī)定，"國家、民族"這樣的字眼是不可以用作商標(biāo)的，所以你看不到"國家"牌冰箱，這樣的注冊很難成功，也不可能成為一個(gè)全球統(tǒng)一化的商標(biāo)。所以松下就換成了現(xiàn)在這樣一個(gè)商標(biāo)。據(jù)說他為這個(gè)商標(biāo)因此整整多花20億美金。在中國也有很明顯的一個(gè)品牌案例，熊貓電子，過去是中國電子行業(yè)當(dāng)中的大哥大。但我們?nèi)ヒ徊樵儯�熊貓商�?biāo)在中國各種詞語當(dāng)中有122個(gè)，都不是他的。最近我們看到聯(lián)想在更名，單單一個(gè)"聯(lián)想"要去注冊不可以，因?yàn)樗�是一個(gè)詞組。一個(gè)商標(biāo)應(yīng)該是在成語、詞組、詞匯，統(tǒng)稱等人們生活當(dāng)中沒有的東西，二你經(jīng)過自己的努力使它變成一個(gè)成語、詞組、詞匯，變成人們生活當(dāng)中某一個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)，某一個(gè)產(chǎn)品，或者變成人們生活中不可缺少的語言，這就是品牌，能做到這一點(diǎn)你就成功了。想把人類共享的文化，或者有部分可以享受的東西，作為商標(biāo)專用權(quán)自己獨(dú)享是不可以的。 但從另外一方面來講，恒源祥也是個(gè)不好的商標(biāo)？如果在中國做沒問題，但對于老外來說就不是漢字，只是三個(gè)圖案，他們不懂，除非讓他們能通過這個(gè)漢字想象出什么，而且要是好的想法。國外最大的宣傳片我去過幾次，看到最多的就是紅高粱，黃土地，穿著破棉襖，他沒有把我們浦東，把我們真正祖國大好河山反映出來。所以他們對我們產(chǎn)品的印象還不是很好。中國應(yīng)該有一個(gè)強(qiáng)勢的文化，強(qiáng)勢的內(nèi)涵推動(dòng)，才能把我們的品牌帶出去，一個(gè)企業(yè)是不行的，不是走回來，就是走不回來，一樣的結(jié)果。為什么這樣講？1997年我們做過一個(gè)調(diào)查，一個(gè)全新的品牌導(dǎo)入美國市場，平均的成本需要7500萬美金，僅僅導(dǎo)入。我們現(xiàn)在到美國去的企業(yè)，有多少家能夠拿出7500萬的美金把一個(gè)品牌導(dǎo)入進(jìn)去？如果你是家電、可樂，7500萬美金還是進(jìn)不進(jìn)去的，何況除了大成本，還要有一個(gè)較長的時(shí)間。導(dǎo)入以后，還有一個(gè)維護(hù)成本，這個(gè)不知道也不行。第三要提升。世界上專門有機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行調(diào)查，消費(fèi)者能夠記住多少品牌？如果把消費(fèi)品算作20大類，能記住的品牌平均每一個(gè)大類不會(huì)超過七個(gè)。因此如果導(dǎo)入品牌，你要爭取進(jìn)入前七位，導(dǎo)入以后要看是不是有別人超越你了，超越了你要維護(hù)你排在前面的位置，有人超越你你還得繼續(xù)提升。這個(gè)錢不是你企業(yè)擁有多少錢決定，導(dǎo)入、維護(hù)和提升的成本是多少，是由所在行業(yè)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者決定的。那按照這個(gè)說法，我們企業(yè)是不是永遠(yuǎn)不可能成功了？不，這些是講的概念，關(guān)鍵是你花多少錢達(dá)到這個(gè)市場效應(yīng)。我們說品牌導(dǎo)入美國是7500萬美金，有人也許1000萬美金同樣也可以。你會(huì)做廣告，我也會(huì)做廣告，我的廣告費(fèi)比你高就不成功，我的廣告費(fèi)比你低也許我就成功了。我們的利潤空間就在這個(gè)地方。人們對廣告的認(rèn)可程度是不同的。我們原來在管理上面把廣告稱作開銷，沒有把廣告看作企業(yè)在市場運(yùn)行當(dāng)中必不可少的成本。開銷可以節(jié)省，可以用多一點(diǎn)少一點(diǎn)，錢多得時(shí)候多一點(diǎn)，錢少的時(shí)候少一點(diǎn)，但廣告其實(shí)是企業(yè)市場運(yùn)營當(dāng)中必不可少的成本，在某種意義上比為員工發(fā)工資更重要。全世界范圍來看，一個(gè)企業(yè)下一年度為員工工資增長一倍，企業(yè)效益增長一倍的可能性有沒有？沒有。但廣告投入增長一倍，企業(yè)效益增長一倍的有沒有？有。因此，我們認(rèn)為企業(yè)在市場運(yùn)行當(dāng)中，不能把廣告認(rèn)為是一種開銷，應(yīng)該是市場運(yùn)行當(dāng)中必不可少的成本，成本不是可以減少開支的，只是怎么用最少的錢達(dá)到最大的效益。我們公司每年確立的第一個(gè)指標(biāo)是廣告投入多少。我們跟人家不一樣，因?yàn)槲覀兂�了品牌什么都沒有，因此我們把它看作是我們第一生命。 恒源祥是一個(gè)在中國運(yùn)行的非國際化的商標(biāo)。如果運(yùn)用我們目前的管理，目前的人才，目前這樣的經(jīng)營模式，是否可以把一個(gè)可能走向國際化的品牌帶向國際化呢？不可能。這不僅僅是商標(biāo)問題，還是我們一個(gè)企業(yè)的問題。我們公司最近也在談?wù)撨@些問題，我們在考慮恒源祥怎樣才能做成一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)？

我自己認(rèn)為，一個(gè)優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)應(yīng)該通過三個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來確定。第一點(diǎn)，要讓恒源祥的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度明晰，我們現(xiàn)在基本上做到了跟國家沒有關(guān)系了，但現(xiàn)在恒源祥的產(chǎn)權(quán)，或者我們的股權(quán)是否能夠在市場當(dāng)中進(jìn)行自由交割和交換呢？我現(xiàn)在賣1％你敢要嗎？不一定敢要。因?yàn)槟?％沒有表決權(quán)，只有看到我們公司有一個(gè)非常好的發(fā)展前景，看他的產(chǎn)權(quán)制度在運(yùn)行上面是否有一個(gè)徹底透明的財(cái)務(wù)，這很關(guān)鍵。如果能夠達(dá)到這點(diǎn)，任何人都愿意把錢投到你這個(gè)公司來，你想把股權(quán)賣掉的時(shí)候有人接受。恒源祥今天還做不到這一點(diǎn)，現(xiàn)在我說我賣股份，人家要看我的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表，我的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表不好看。你說一個(gè)企業(yè)，人家不敢買你的股票，你是優(yōu)秀企業(yè)嗎？當(dāng)然不是。我們計(jì)劃通過五年時(shí)間的努力達(dá)到這樣一個(gè)目標(biāo)，誰要恒源祥的產(chǎn)權(quán)，進(jìn)行競標(biāo)完成就可以成為大股東。 第二是人力資源政策。我們現(xiàn)在人力資源政策不行，那要做到什么程度？要把自己企業(yè)所在這個(gè)行業(yè)這個(gè)地位當(dāng)中最優(yōu)秀的人才，不通過什么特殊的政策就能夠吸納進(jìn)來，而不是個(gè)體的概念，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)人有什么專長，所以我給你特定的政策吸引你到我公司來。不是這個(gè)概念，我正常的政策就是最好的政策，就能夠把最好的人才吸納進(jìn)來。同時(shí)還要做到，讓最不優(yōu)秀的人自然地離開你的公司。我們不講差的，恒源祥沒有差的，個(gè)個(gè)都是好的，是否能夠有這樣的機(jī)制，讓變動(dòng)中的人自然而然地走。 第三個(gè)，團(tuán)隊(duì)的整體競爭力，是否讓人們感覺做什么都可以。我們平常講這個(gè)人不錯(cuò)，做什么像什么，團(tuán)隊(duì)也可以這樣去衡量。恒源祥現(xiàn)在做這個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)不錯(cuò)，做其他的行不行？應(yīng)該是行的，因?yàn)槲覀冇羞@樣一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)。任何離開恒源祥的人，他的競爭力最多能維持兩年，兩年以后肯定和我們不太一樣，因?yàn)槲覀冞@個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)每天都在進(jìn)步，每天都在發(fā)展，離開以后就沒有這個(gè)感受。我們是搞經(jīng)營運(yùn)營模式的，到目前為止，我還沒有找到一個(gè)比在我們公司里面連續(xù)發(fā)展更好的員工。所以我對自己的公司還是比較有信心，充滿希望。

最后談一談我們公司目前的情況。恒源祥從1998年以前做手編毛線，到今天已經(jīng)品牌進(jìn)行延展為三大類主要產(chǎn)品，針織、服裝、家用紡織品。我們的羊毛衫號稱中國第一，襪子一年做一千萬雙，襯衣一百多萬件，我們的產(chǎn)品遍布全中國。我們這種延展是在沒有資金投入的情況下進(jìn)行的，到目前為止是中國品牌延展最成功的一個(gè)企業(yè)。當(dāng)然我們還會(huì)不斷的努力，進(jìn)一步提升自己。我們經(jīng)營過程當(dāng)中用的是虛擬特許經(jīng)營，恒源祥沒有一個(gè)工廠和一個(gè)商店，所有的商店和工廠都是加盟形式的。在這種條件下，靠什么力量來你的品牌、產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、對生產(chǎn)制造、銷售點(diǎn)進(jìn)行控制、管理呢？我們只能慢慢努力，不斷地對進(jìn)行灌輸，慢慢來做這方面的工作。這在目前對我們來說是恰到好處的方法。如果有人說恒源祥沒有做好，我的理由和狡辯的語言就是沒有恰到好處。做什么事情都一樣，恰到好處才會(huì)有效果，做的太好不切合實(shí)際也不行。正如企業(yè)改革，不能一步到位，你走在前面不行，走的太慢也不行，我們要找準(zhǔn)機(jī)會(huì)，恰到好處。當(dāng)時(shí)95、96年開戰(zhàn)略研討會(huì)，當(dāng)時(shí)恒源祥發(fā)展很好，有專家就提出恒源祥要獨(dú)立，自行運(yùn)行，那時(shí)候講沒有恰到好處，所以發(fā)生了96年變成分公司的結(jié)果，很痛苦。到我們國家股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓以后，恰到好處的時(shí)間來了，我們也長大成熟了，所以恒源祥的MBO在中國還被專家成為是最成功、最經(jīng)典、最有價(jià)格的案例。

EU-China Relations

(Excerpts from a speech given at CEIBS by Stanley Crossick. Content rights reserved by the speaker and CEIBS. Use of the content must be with the prior approval from CEIBS.)

Stanley Crossick (Biography)

Director, Founding Chairman of the European Policy Centre

Dec. 2, 2002

It's an honour to be with you in Shanghai and to be talking to China's leading business school. I looked through the literature of the school and saw as your main objective: To contribute to the economic development of this country and its business community. Judging by the sudden expansion in Shanghai, China needs all the MBAs it can get.

A business manager's main focus is inevitably going to be managing a particular business or organisation, facing central and microeconomic problems. But a top business manager must also understand the environment within which he or she manages. By environment I mean local, national, regional, global, economic, political, social. All these are, of course, interrelated in today's world. I hope my lecture will help a little in that direction. It's on EU/China relations.

I reckon to spend a few minutes on how I see the basis of the relationship, or certainly how it seems in Brussels. I'll take a look at the relationship as seen across Europe, then look at the culture and try to see into the future.

For convenience sake, let's just talk European. I'm sure you understand that the European Union has around 15 countries. It will soon have 25 countries. It's not technically the whole of Europe, but it's rather easier to talk about Europe than the European Union every time.

Current policy is based on communications of the European Union Commission in Brussels, an executive as of May 2001. It was built on communications of three years earlier. There are three areas at which the relationship has looked: political and human rights dialogues; economic and trade relationships; and Europe-China co-operations.

As you know, the two-way trade between us exceeds 100 billion Euros. China is Europe's third leading trading partner behind the United States and Japan. Europe is China's second largest export market. It is expected this year that China will replace the United States as the leading beneficiary of direct investment money.

Europe has welcomed the acceptance of China to the Global Trade Organisation and has always been a supporter of that membership, although implementation of what that membership entails has thus regressed.

Europe is fully committed to supporting reform and improvisation in this country, both working with the Beijing government but also working across China with no less than 40 co-operation projects, ranging from environment to education to business governments to enterprise reform to financial services. So Europe is trying to help at different levels of society.

There are three priorities for Brussels. First is to support the economic and social reforms. Second is to improve the environment and work towards sustainable development. Thirdly, the area of good government and strengthening of the rule of law. We have bilateral summits, the last of which took place in September of this year, and there are a great deal of exchanges at different ministry and official levels.

Good integration into the international community-and that what it's all about-is not of course just about changing laws and regulations. It involves changing mentalities and requires extreme information and trading effort, which Europe tries to do its best to help China with.

There have been good business relationships from Europe. Obviously it's very important to us. How can a country with more than 1.2 billion people be other than important to us? Historically our relationship with the United States has been the most important, so far, and has dwarfed all other relationships. And it still does economically, politically and from a security standpoint.

But two things are happening. Although economically it is still, by far, the most important trading relationship in the world, it is between two mature markets and growth is therefore limited. Politically, we are growing apart. The tragic events of the 11th of September brought into sharp focus on a trend which was already there. Our American friends and we tend to see the world and its problems rather differently. We also tend to see different countries in different lights.

Much more binds Europe and United States together than divides them, and the relationship will remain critically important. But because as I said, the markets are mature, clearly one day our trade with China may well compete with our trade with the United States. It has a long way to go. Our mutual trade is 100 billion Euros; we have 600 billion Euros with the United States. But because of the mature markets I mentioned, we are in need of other markets and China is potentially the biggest.

Second, while there are still substantial policy differences between China and Europe on some issues, we think more alike than we do with our American friends. For example, policy toward Iraq and terrorism. And generally we tend to see the world in shades of grey rather than in black and white focus, which you get from the United States. So we also see, in the political field, China as a stabilising influence in the region and globally.

Let me leave beside the United States connection and turn directly to the China-Europe relationship. As I said, we can not ignore 1.2 billion people economically or politically. Economically, Europe supports Chinese trade expansion and liberalisation. At the same time, we are obviously worried about the trade deficit we have with China, which is 45 billion Euros and likely to grow. For this reason, we are anxious to see that normal trade barriers are reduced and that no new ones are erected. We hope that China's entry into the WTO will encourage this.

European experience is notably available on how to adopt rules and policies to globalization and how to minimise at the same time the resulting economic effects. Europe is keen to help ease China into the global system. But at the same time, we have some concerns. It is obvious that you need a sound microeconomic policy. We understand that structural changes take time. But we are a little impatient (for) the Chinese government to combat piracy and counterfeiting and to increase respect for intellectual property law, a subject of very great importance in the West and of great, great importance to companies as they develop their opportunities here in China.

And in general, we are concerned about the enforcement of legislation if nothing else. That legislation complies, in theory, with international standards even if in practice it does not. So to us, always, the rule of law is critically important, from an economic and business standpoint as well as a political one. And it is this improved law enforcement and general development of the rule of law that is important for China if it is going to protect and increase its direct investment.

Turning to the political dimension, Europe wants a stable China, along which will influence regional and global stability. Its key objects are to help China achieve a society that is based on rule of law, and keeping this rule of law is central to us. That is what we would like. Because we believe that only an open society will bring long-term stability and economic prosperity. Of course, it's understood that if you bring in structured reforms too quickly or without sufficient care, they can have a destabilising effect. It is for China and its leadership to work. Europe is there to provide support and encouragement; it is not there to dictate what to do and how to do it.

However, as China has chosen to join the World Trade Organisation and accepts the obligations that follow from membership, it has to address a number of issues. For example, the WTO rules require judicial review of administrative action in the economic sphere. Individuals and companies must have recourse of action against, for example, my administration. That is required by the WTO. You will see it will have an effect on your own legal system in other spheres.

In the transition toward a local society, different constituents in society need to be encouraged. The civil society in Europe is very important. The Non-Governmental Organisations, by the way, are trusted in Europe by the people far more than the governments. Again, the EU-China dialogue and co-operation is there to help.

Our political dialogue has broadened and now addresses issues such as international terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Separate from that, there are also twice-yearly dialogues specifically on human rights, which allows the discussion of a wide range of issues. There are also a number of co-operative projects. For example, Chinese implementation of United Nations human rights covenants, local democratisation and legal and judicial reform. Europe keeps a vigilant eye on Hong Kong and Macao, but so far is comfortable with the implementation of that "One Country, Two Systems" policy. I just came from Hong Kong, in fact. The success of this unique Hong Kong structure is vitally important to China as well as to Hong Kong. It is important to the international status of China and the ultimate resolution of the Taiwan dispute.

Turning now to this relationship as seen from China, I note this more as an encouragement to you to give your views when we have a discussion afterward. They are perhaps more like hopes; they're not really for me to know more than that. Economically, Europe offers to China a large market, a pool of investment and co-operation in a wide range of fields. I think we also offer patience and understanding. I hope that's seen from China, and a willingness to help in your transition. You may be suspicious that Europe wants to exploit China commercially. We only have to look back at history and you can understand such a concern. But of course trade is not a zero sum game. Both sides can be winners. There is every reason they will be.

The second concern I expect from the Chinese standpoint is that we Europeans tend to regard China too much as a developing country. Europe's research and development investment in China confirms its belief in the quantity and quality of Chinese talent available. China's economic transformation has been due, partly, to foreign technology and management, but the Chinese workforce also plays an extremely important role.

Europe now sees China, particularly since the WTO admission, economically in global terms. The Chinese view should be enhanced by our enlargement from 15 to 25 countries shortly. Politically, we have to look at this internally and externally. Should you be worried about any attempted European interference in your internal affairs? I suggest no. But you have to expect, from time to time, public criticism in the West on issues of human rights treatment, of the Falun Gong, Tibet and maybe Hong Kong and Taiwan. But European governments are likely to remain supportive of Chinese government policies in the absence of serious incidents. On one hand, we are encouraging the move and the transition to modern and democratic society. We are urging a fast approach, yes, but we understand the process has to be controlled and the big debate, of course, is what the control really means. How fast can you change?

Externally, should the enlargement of the EU and NATO worry China? Should European development of a defence and security policy alarm to be a worry? My answer is no. Europe does not see China as a threat. Indeed the only threats we see today come from rogue states and international terrorism. So long as China is helping to defeat these forces in its own interest as well as global interest, I see no problem.

In view of the historically antagonistic Sino-Russian relationship, should China be worried about the quasi-admission of Russia to NATO and the closer relations between Europe and Russia? I answer no again. Because our relations with Russia confirm Europe's willingness to help Russia as it seeks to help China. And Russia, too, must be a responsible member of the international community. We welcome it as such. Europe has no desire to play one country off against another. I know that sometimes statements out of Washington suggest the Americans may think that way from time to time. At least we in Europe have learned that balance of power and divide and rule policies of the 19th and 20th centuries lead to catastrophic results. In Europe we have pooled our sovereignty in the interest of ever-closer co-operation.

Finally, we come to China's old enemy-Japan. Japan and Europe relations are good but unexciting, which I think in Chinese terms is good. If I understand correctly, living in exciting times is a curse. So that makes relations good but unexciting. There are virtually no problems economically and there's very little dialogue between Tokyo and Brussels. Again, I don't see that anything Europe does in its relationship with Japan has any negative impact on China.

You may tell me after I finish this. But then your assessment of the China-Europe relationship as seen from China's perspective is rather more relevant than mine. And I'm more concerned to have you come out with your views then necessarily defending mine.

So much then for the present. Turning to the future. Might my optimistic presentation prove wrong? Of course. What might affect it? In today's fast moving, fast-changing society there are many things: a change in leadership in China or Europe; a change of policies in China or Europe; economic change in China; political destabilisation in China; other unforeseen events. It's hard to see European leadership and European policies changing toward China and introducing a different scenario for China-European relations. But of course, European reaction to events in China could change that. But we hope there will be no events that would change that.

Conversely, we see no sign of any leadership or policy changes coming down from China which would cause concern as to our relationship. But we do recognise there remains the risk of economic failure and political destabilisation. As I said, there's always the unforeseen events, of which there are many more these days than there used to be.

In conclusion, I think China faces not only economic and political uncertainties, that Europe has a deep interest and indeed a deep stake in helping China in a manner, which will produce a stable, prosperous and open country, a China in which the rule of law prevails. Europe has a vested interest in helping China economically and politically, both in China regionally and globally. Europe has much to offer China in this. China is bound to be become the dominant regional power and a global force. We in Europe seek to help build a strong, confident China taking its place as a world power. History tells us that danger does not come from a powerful nation economically successful and politically stable, confidant in its own destiny. Danger comes from nations which are powerful but which lack confidence and which feel threatened.

I conclude with two quotations and one recommendation. Jean Monnet, founder of the European Union, closed his memoirs with a sentence to the effect that the European Community, as it then was, is at a stage on the road to the organised world of tomorrow. By that, he meant that a successful Europe might become a force to help make ours a better world and to secure, in today's language if you like, effective global governance. That sounds very idealistic, but that is what the European Union is all about.

My recommendation is that each one of us, in China and Europe, and all the others in all their spheres, promote exchanges between us, particular among your age group so as to increase our mutual understanding, which in many areas is very lacking on both sides.

The second Jean Monnet quote, also from his memoirs, comes out of his visit to Shanghai in 1933 as a banker. His words of wisdom are how to deal with the Chinese. I quote: "The secret is simple: Act as you speak. See there's never any contradiction between what you say and what you do."

It's a good lesson for all human relations, but, alas, one that is rarely followed.

Investor Relations

(Excerpts from the speech. Content rights reserved by the speaker and CEIBS. Use of the content must be with the prior approval from CEIBS.)

Michael Jacobi (Biography)

CFO of Ciba Specialty Chemicals

Nov. 29, 2002

Good afternoon. I am pleased to be with you. Who here knows Ciba? I would like to very quickly talk a little about Ciba and talk about investor relations. As CFO of our company, I spend one third of my time on investor relations.

Let me give you a piece of advice that we use for investors. I'll tell you: Who is Ciba? What is investor relations? What does it mean, really? Who are our customers? How do we meet them? What is that thing called investor relations? And some investor relations dos and don'ts.

We are Ciba Specialty Chemicals. We produce so-called specialty chemicals. It's something you do not find in shops. You cannot find us. We work primarily on things that change the colour, performance or look and feel of certain products you buy. You will always find us in small ingredients in something bigger. It's like spices in food. We are not spices in food, but ingredients in other products.

These are the segments, the business areas that we are in. I'll give you an example of our products as we go along. Overall, the company has about $5 billion US dollars in sales. We are in Switzerland. That is why we talk about Swiss francs. Our headquarters is in Basel, Switzerland. Our four segments we're in are about the same size, so it is a very balanced portfolio and we have very strong market positions. That's one of the good things when you're talking about investor relations. We are a large company, a billion-dollar industry, and we have very strong segments and leading positions. It's much easier to explain your company and investor relations this way than if you come in and say, "We are a small company and we don't particularly define the market."

What are our products? One is plastic additives. All these core businesses are about $1.5 billion US Dollars in size. They are very large companies that are number one in the market world-wide. They are spread all over the world, obviously also in China. Being a European-based company, for us, the biggest market is the United States. The second biggest is Germany. The third biggest market is China. For us, China is very important in terms of presence. We have a very large presence here. We have a lot of factories, several in Shanghai and Qingdao. It's really a very important market.

What do we produce here? You have plastic, polyethylene. You can't use polyethylene-plastic bags and wrapping-anymore without using additives that stabilise against light. Otherwise it falls apart. In order to stabilise it, we produce these additives for the plastic industry. We produce them here, among others, in Shanghai. It's one of our most recent plants, right here in Pudong. If you want to see the plant, we'd be happy to show you around. Just get in touch with us. It's a very nice plant, definitely an expensive plant.

We also make coating effects. These are very exciting things. Where do you find us? You find us basically on cars. If anyone has a red car. Red cars, they used to turn kind of brownish. The new cars don't anymore and that's because they use something that comes from our company. The red colour comes from us.

You also find this with CDRs. It's an interesting example. CDRs, recordable CDs, if you look from the side, you see some green shade. It's usually silvery or gold, then a green shade. That is a pigment. We make that pigment. We have a modest market share. It's the registration on which the laser burns. It registers the information on the colour, the pigment. The pigment comes from us, primarily sold in Taiwan.

These are typical things we have here. Alessi, typical kitchenware in Europe. These colours all come from us. We make modern paper treatment products, which go into paper production. I see some of you have white paper. The additive that makes the paper look white, two-thirds world-wide comes from us. In water treatment, cleaning water, we are quite strong. In oil trimming-separating the oil and water-the chemicals used in the extraction industry are chemicals we produce. We are not so large, but still quite common in the industry.

Textile chemicals, dyes and special effects for textiles. We are the world's number one producer of chemicals for the textile industry. All the colours come from us. By the way, in the typical business suit, there are 60 chemicals in a suit. Another thing that comes from us is all kinds of special effects for the fashion industry. We have one product, to protect clothes. You can spill beer and food and anything on clothes and it doesn't get dirty. This is a product we produce and sell in the industry. This is, for us, an important thing for you to see us, coming into these industries.

Last but not least is home and personal care. Whiteners for the detergents to clean the wash, or microbial agents. These are products we produce. That gives you an idea of what the company is all about in terms of business.

In terms of profitability, you see it is a company with profitability. Our sales are very much on track. We will reach our $5 billion in US Dollars at year-end, easygoing. And we have very good margins. It's one of the most profitable companies in the industry. At the moment we are probably one of the most successful ones. I say that not because I work at Ciba but because our investors tell us we are one that they regard as a benchmark in the industry. It's a very strong company profit-wise as well.

So that is one of the jobs of investor relations, provide regular information on the company, products, and what they do to, to the financial markets. The second job is when anyone has a question, you have to give an answer. You can't just sound good; you have to know what you're talking about.

You can not go out and struggle. You have to know about our stock; you have to read up. If you don't, they don't call you up again. We monitor the development in the financial investment markets; we know what is going on. That's a task we have to do. Find out where an investor has problems, where there's change. We monitor that. We have to do that very carefully.

So that is getting information. And the other hand, we feed things (send out information). It is not a one way street. You have to listen very much to what happens in the market, what investors want, what they would like to hear, what they think is good, what is not so good. Then you have to find a way to tell them that information. It's not so easy. You have to think how do you tell the audience, your boss, exactly what the people would like to hear. You have to think very carefully how you phrase this stuff.

So that's one way of doing it. And then there are some other things, companies we're monitoring and so on, which in our case is part of investor relations.

Now who are our customers? Our customers are, on one side, financial analysts. They are either part of a bank or part of an investment (company). We distinguish between so called sales-side analysts and buy-side analysts. Sales-side analysts are those who help sell the materials. Reports written on companies are written by sales-side analysts. They are specialised groups of people. They basically follow an industry and write about the companies in this industry.

On the other hand are the buy-side analysts. These are the analysts that help investors compile information (so that they can) make a decision. The large pension funds that invest in shares have people who specialise, on their side, in monitoring investments. These are buy-side analysts. In the end, you have the fund managers, who are the ones who really decide to buy or not to buy.

Then you have individual investors, who want to buy their own shares. These are our customers. We get a lot of them.

Just to give you an idea, our company has about 100,000 shareholders. We're very broadly distributed. Out of that, 99500 are private individuals, who own between one and a lot of shares. But really the big amount in capital is owned by financial institutions. It's something you see a lot in this industry. Big investors are usually institutions like pension funds, investment funds, insurance companies, all these that own shares. They are the prime people we talk to. In our case, (our stock) is distributed all around the world. We can't just look at Switzerland and say, what happens in Switzerland. Less than half our shareholders are Swiss. Twenty-five to 30 per cent are American shareholders, so I happen to go a lot to the United States.

If you ever want to work in investor relations, English is absolutely necessary. There is no other language than English. No matter which country you're in, you'd better be absolutely fluent in English; otherwise you won't have a chance. The technical terms are all English.

How do we have contact? What do we do? These are the typical things you do. First of all you have large-scale events. You invite the investors and invite the analysts for presentations. They happen in Switzerland. (Some particular meetings, for instance,) happen usually at headquarters. Results, you have that two times a year where you present-like the slides you've seen hereabout the company, key events, and so on. You have road shows, these are very exciting. We have, in our case, three regular large trips. We go to a lot of countries in a very short period of time. You go to a lot of cities, and you really meet a lot of investors. Then you have short trips that usually held at the investor's work. You meet the investors for about an hour. You come to the office, for one hour, to talk about the company. You're there for one hour, you make a presentation. That is called the one-on-one. These things we have quite a lot.

Then, at Basel, at our headquarters, we have individuals or groups who come to visit you. We have roughly 150 of these meetings per year. We have things like telephone conferences. I sit in a room and with my hierarchy, I speak into a microphone for 20 minutes and then there are 60 minutes questions and answers afterward. They can ask anything they want. There are usually 100 people listening in. This is the kind of thing you have to watch out for. You have to be very cautious of what you're saying. Because everyone can listen very concentrated. On the telephone you can lose much more. I have to be very cautious what I say, because someone will call me up later and say, "You said this, I wrote it down." In the beginning I was always sweating (and soaking) wet after one hour. By now I know the story, who is asking the questions? It's easy going. Easy going. I can say, "How is the weather in…"

These are the quantities. You get an idea. It depends on size. Road shows, at one per month, you can imagine I'm often on the plane. Telephone conferences. You have a lot of meetings, telephone conferences. You have to be an extrovert to stand through this.

Here's a typical road show schedule, the number of meetings I have per day. Zurich in the afternoon, one meeting. Find my way to the airport. Fly to Milwaukee in the United States, have one meeting. Fly to Toronto for four meetings. Fly to San Francisco, have three meetings. Go back to Switzerland and so on. You probably can imagine it's extremely exciting, huh? You can be sure if you're in investor relations you know all the airports. You know exactly what the airports look like. You have a new sport called airport jogging.

In these meetings, you have a routine. You have two choices. You can do a presentation and question and answers afterward, or you only have questions and answers. When you get to the lower part (the end part of the schedule), you prefer only Q&A. You can't give your own presentation any more. So that's one problem. Another problem is, at some point in time, you start believing your own presentation. So it truly is a tough story. This is really what happened in October. Two weeks ago, in one week I had 13 flights. If you don't like it, don't go into that industry. That's typically what we do. We have usually give to eight meetings a day. We stop saying, "Let's have lunches and dinners," otherwise it's no good. It's really a heavy schedule. 14/15/16 flights in this example. It's really long.

What do we tell in our presentation, our Q&A? It always goes similarly. Company strategy. You have to be very familiar with it, and financial results. One of the prerequisites for working in investor relations is clearly a strong knowledge of accounting. You have to have it. Otherwise don't try. You have to be able to analyse your own company's results. You have to have good knowledge of them. If you just want to talk, you won't survive too long in this. You have to clearly to know accounting and how to interpret numbers clearly (is vital). With Q&As, you just have to be able to answer everything. It's very simple. You have to get it done.

Now what do we want to achieve with all this investor relations? It's not only a marketing job. This is not a public relations exercise to put the company in the best position. That would be a disaster very quickly if people were to do that. This is not an advertising campaign. We are not the marketing department of Ciba. We leave that to corporate communications, which we have as well. They can put out a nice (bulletin).

Investor relations is a clear, transparent picture on company strategy. So you have to, as well, be showing weaknesses; you can not just show the nice things. You have to explain the financial situation of the company. And you have to have an open discussion of problems. You have to be willing as well to commit errors, and be willing as well to share weaknesses. If you do not do this, the investors do not believe you any more. Then you don't have to show up. So you have to be very open, be very clear of what you tell and you have to be frank and show the problems.

The worst thing is when the investors start yelling at you. It happened to me in 1998. The company did not have good results, and they (the investors) came and the people said they want their money back. We launched a bond; the bond dropped very heavily. Shortly afterward, I had to go to a conference. Everybody shouted at me and said, "We want our money back." I said. "Forget it," They were very unhappy the share price did not behave as it should be. Take your time to talk it out. The worst thing you can do is not show up. That is a disaster. You must be able to explain what is going on and explain to people very clearly.

What is required for an investor relations manager in terms of knowledge? A very profound knowledge. It does not necessarily require 20 years in the company, but you have to learn very hard, be very effective and know what to talk about. Accounting, as I said, (is key) and you have to know about the company's industry. It's not so good if someone asks about a competitor and you say," I've never heard about them." They only ask that question once.

Connections - you have very close contact with top management. Our IR manager has an open door to everyone in the company. There is no place he can not go and talk with each and every manager. He travels around in the company very often. I think he's already been in China once or twice already. He sees the problems because he must be able to talk about them. He must see what he presents; otherwise he can't identify. He really has to go around and must know the other (players) in investment community. He really has to know the people very well.

Personal characteristics of investor relations manager: Very, very honest. You can not be a key person who sneaks off. You have to be an extrovert. Accessible. If not, people won't call you. Good presentation skills. You can't be someone who says, "I don't know." You have to be there, be precise, and bring the message across. (There's) a lot of need (for) real training on presentation, how to do this. If you can sell something bad, you can sell good, too. If the results are bad and presentation are bad, then goodnight.

Let me give you an example, fortunately not from our company. One of our competitors in one of the conference calls they had with investors, everything went reasonably well. At the end, one of the people said, "Thank you very much. It was nice to have you here. Now we'll close the conference call." And then he forgot to switch off the phone. And then he said to one of his people, "Thank God that is over; now we can go back to work." Everybody knew. It was an absolute disaster. I know two companies where that happened. Watch out for the microphone.

At Ciba, this is not a one way street of information. We have to hear of the trends of our competitors, what happens in the industry. Investors tell you, "We heard from this company that they do that; what do you think about this?" And I say, "Interesting. Very interesting, challenging." You write it down immediately. And then off we go, because we have the best customer intelligence. We get a lot of information on our competition. They don't have everything.

We hear about companies, what's going on in the investment community, which place has problems. You find out very quickly. When you visit the investor, the people in the bank, everyone is very (aware) of what is going on. (You learn) what investors think of Ciba.

You study: What do they think? What's an example of how people look at us? What is the sentiment? How many recommend to buy our shares, recommend to hold, recommend to sell the shares? Which, by the way, we don't like too much. It's a pattern you have to monitor carefully. Why would they recommend to buy the share? Because it's cheap, which is not our case. Or because it's a sound company, which is more the evaluation of the financial community. It's a very big level picture, but you have to look at it. This is typically an outcome; you have all kinds of comments.

Something we hear lots of comments on, so it's worth mentioning: We receive a lot of focus on cash flow from the investment community. It's something that is very important now. (Of all the things we) look at in management concepts, cash flow is one of the most important ones. We do that nicely; that's why I can say it's important. We as well see the benefit in share price, the benefit of concentrating clearly on cash flow as one of the key drivers. (Investors) look at the portfolio, look at cash generation. These are typical comments you get about the company. It's a very important statement now, after the IT bubble has burst, the telecom bubble has burst. World-wide, you see investors concentrating on cash flow, a strong balance sheet, sound financing. It's very important.

In closing, I asked our IR manager what points he would bring along. He said: Accountability. It's an integral part of the top management job, that you are there. You're honest between the people at top management. It's very important to people in IR. You talk to management and you have to have their respect. Reliability is very important, so there are no surprises when you come out, there are no disasters building. That means good financial monitoring systems within the company, good processes that are transparent. And trust. You only can be successful if you are honest. You can say yes, that is not going well. Yes, this is going well. And you must have confidence, in knowing what you can talk about.

戴爾供應(yīng)鏈之解說

--- 演講全文 （根據(jù)錄音整理并翻譯，演講者本人和ＣＥＩＢＳ版權(quán)所有。如需轉(zhuǎn)載，必須先與ＣＥＩＢＳ市場及公共關(guān)系部取得聯(lián)系。）

方國健 [簡介]

戴爾計(jì)算機(jī)公司亞太地區(qū)國際采購管理部前任總經(jīng)理

2002年11月25日

各位中歐國際工商學(xué)院的朋友們、學(xué)長、教授，以及參加貝塔斯曼活動(dòng)的朋友們，大家晚上好！

我現(xiàn)在是麥實(shí)管理顧問公司總裁，經(jīng)營創(chuàng)投基金，或者稱為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)基金管理公司。在這之前我在戴爾計(jì)算機(jī)服務(wù)了十一年，把戴爾電腦引進(jìn)到臺灣，成立了被國際采購組織通稱的IPO(International Procurement Office)，后來統(tǒng)稱為亞太供應(yīng)管理公司，當(dāng)中有11年的時(shí)間。我一直認(rèn)為自己很幸運(yùn)也很榮幸，目睹了戴爾電腦11年非常成功的發(fā)展。我去年年底離開以后，有很多朋友鼓勵(lì)我，你是戴爾第一位華籍高級員工，親眼目睹了這么成功的經(jīng)歷，你有責(zé)任把你的經(jīng)驗(yàn)分享給華人，所以我鼓起勇氣寫了一本書，就是《海闊天空》。這本書今年3月在臺灣出版，今年10月由中國財(cái)政經(jīng)濟(jì)出版社在大陸出版。原本來中國大陸的意義是推廣活動(dòng)，但是我更愿意把它當(dāng)作經(jīng)驗(yàn)的分享，所以安排幾個(gè)大學(xué)的演講，并因?yàn)槁牨娙旱牟灰粯�，我將針對不同的主題進(jìn)行發(fā)揮。今天在座的大部分都是中歐國際工商學(xué)院的學(xué)院，以商業(yè)研究為主，所以我會(huì)著重戴爾電腦成功的經(jīng)驗(yàn)還有戴爾的管理。

戴爾電腦的成功

我一向有一個(gè)很深刻的感覺，公司的成功最主要的是公司的文化，圍繞它周圍的就是各種組織管理、策略的運(yùn)用、執(zhí)行面，所以如果要談到戴爾電腦的成功，我們多多少少要強(qiáng)調(diào)一些企業(yè)文化，有哪些大家不容易看到的地方。首先我簡單介紹一下戴爾公司。

邁克爾戴爾于1984年在大學(xué)宿舍里創(chuàng)立戴爾公司

去年的資料顯示戴爾電腦在2001年第一季度正式超過康柏電腦，成為全球最大的電腦公司，去年9月份由于惠普跟康柏合并，戴爾暫時(shí)退回第二的位置。無論是分析師的立場還是個(gè)人的立場，我都有相當(dāng)大的信心，再奪回寶座只是時(shí)間的問題，最多三個(gè)季度，最快下個(gè)季度也許會(huì)看到這個(gè)結(jié)果。IT界有很多好事之徒，去年9月份HP宣布購并康柏的時(shí)候，網(wǎng)絡(luò)上就傳來一幅畫面很有意思。因?yàn)榻?jīng)過長期的競爭，康柏被合并以后變成一個(gè)消滅模式，康柏的名字從此以后就不見了，也等于是戴爾親手把康柏埋進(jìn)去了。當(dāng)時(shí)我還在戴爾，看到這個(gè)畫面以后，也不禁會(huì)心一笑。

戴爾也是全球唯一的直銷公司

有些公司最近幾年都在模仿或者效仿直銷的模式，但是多多少少都遇到很多問題，戴爾是唯一最成功的直銷公司。到去年年底為止已經(jīng)有31個(gè)季度維持超過業(yè)界平均值成長。在IT界平均成長率達(dá)到16-17％的時(shí)候，戴爾的成長是在30-40％之間。某些公司偶爾會(huì)有些明星產(chǎn)品的出現(xiàn)，有一些特別優(yōu)秀的表現(xiàn)，但是能否維持8年多持續(xù)成長的成功，就不一定了。這也就驗(yàn)證了中國的一句話，"路遙知馬力"。

戴爾非常重視客戶滿意程度，很強(qiáng)烈的注重指標(biāo) 1999年2月獲選首度美國最受尊崇的公司，還有全球最受尊崇的公司。這個(gè)評比不光是它的業(yè)績和股價(jià)，最主要的是社會(huì)大眾對它的看法，還有員工對它的滿意程度。這個(gè)評比在戴爾內(nèi)部被當(dāng)作一個(gè)很重要的榮譽(yù)，表示我們真正是一個(gè)成功的公司，不單單是一個(gè)經(jīng)營良好的公司。2000年5月被選為Harris Poll美國品牌印象調(diào)查之前十名。前四名為Sony、GM、GE、Ford。這些都是每天接觸的普通大眾，所有人都看得到的產(chǎn)品，IT產(chǎn)業(yè)要排到那么高的位置比較不容易，但戴爾能夠領(lǐng)先所有包括IBM、HP在內(nèi)IT廠商，得到第五名。

美國一些基金經(jīng)理人對戴爾的評價(jià)很高，他們認(rèn)為在過去兩年極為惡劣的環(huán)境底下，戴爾能夠展現(xiàn)驚人的韌性。

成功的原因

我個(gè)人喜歡把它分為兩大類：一個(gè)是因?yàn)橹变N模式所帶來的一些先天體制上的優(yōu)點(diǎn)，別人很難學(xué)或者學(xué)不會(huì)。第一點(diǎn)它免除了中間經(jīng)銷商的利潤，這一點(diǎn)很簡單，不用大腦也可以想得清楚，因?yàn)樗�有的產(chǎn)品都直接賣到用戶手上。第二，也是因?yàn)橹变N，所以它不通過任何中間經(jīng)銷商來賣，所以所有流進(jìn)來的訂單都是真實(shí)需求而不是預(yù)估，不會(huì)因?yàn)轭A(yù)估造成風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我們通常看到每年1月份，經(jīng)過圣誕節(jié)的銷售以后，許多廠商在渠道里多余的存貨都退回來了，因此而頭痛，因?yàn)閹齑嫘枰�調(diào)整。戴爾沒有這個(gè)煩惱，因?yàn)樗�的產(chǎn)品是零庫存，每一臺都直接送到用戶手上了。第三，計(jì)算機(jī)的一些組件長期下來都是走低的，所以在零庫存的時(shí)候，任何時(shí)間賣的產(chǎn)品都反映你當(dāng)時(shí)的成本，如果你賣的是兩個(gè)月以前的產(chǎn)品，一定有跌價(jià)損失，但戴爾沒有任何跌價(jià)損失。第四，也因?yàn)槭侵变N，所以掌握到的市場偏好是直接的，對產(chǎn)品的走向都能及時(shí)反應(yīng)到設(shè)計(jì)部門還有策劃部門。第五，產(chǎn)品要推出到市面上，通常要有一個(gè)收集資料的階段，一般的公司要三到五個(gè)月才能收到品質(zhì)的資料，回饋到產(chǎn)品的設(shè)計(jì)部去調(diào)整產(chǎn)品。戴爾每一臺機(jī)器賣的時(shí)候都有客戶資料存盤，所以在很短的時(shí)間內(nèi)就可以收集到正確而及時(shí)的品質(zhì)資料，回饋至生產(chǎn)線去作細(xì)部改善工作，因此任一新機(jī)種都可以在最短的時(shí)間內(nèi)達(dá)到品質(zhì)優(yōu)化的境界。第六，這幾年有很多競爭者在模仿直銷模式。競爭者的模仿是對你最高的一個(gè)推崇，因?yàn)檫B你的競爭者都要走你的路，客戶看在眼里就很明顯了，戴爾是直銷模式的開山之祖，他是最好的。所以當(dāng)很多競爭者在模仿我們的時(shí)候，有很多客戶也轉(zhuǎn)向了戴爾。也因?yàn)镮nternet的風(fēng)行，Internet沒有時(shí)差沒有距離，是最有力的直銷工具，網(wǎng)絡(luò)可以使直銷模式表現(xiàn)的淋漓盡致，對直銷來講如虎添翼。

我剛才講的是因?yàn)橹变N模式引申出來的優(yōu)勢，也就是先天的體質(zhì)優(yōu)勢，別人不能模仿或者很難模仿的地方。

接下來講別人不能模仿或者很難模仿的地方，那就是它的經(jīng)營管理。

接下來講，那就是它的經(jīng)營管理，也就是后天的營養(yǎng)與鍛煉。

邁克爾.戴爾19歲創(chuàng)業(yè)，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)37歲了，能夠穩(wěn)當(dāng)當(dāng)?shù)刈�在CEO的位置那么長的時(shí)間沒有被浪潮沖倒，這是不簡單的事情。大家看到業(yè)界很多明顯的例子，創(chuàng)業(yè)容易守業(yè)不易，很多人創(chuàng)業(yè)時(shí)很輝煌，但是隨著公司的成長因不能逐漸地跟上公司發(fā)展的腳步而退出舞臺。像蘋果計(jì)算機(jī)的創(chuàng)始人沒幾年被董事會(huì)請出去了，因?yàn)樗麤]辦法把公司帶到往上經(jīng)營的路線上，所以給董事會(huì)踢了出去�？蛋赜�(jì)算機(jī)的創(chuàng)始人之一也是在1992年被董事會(huì)請出去的。戴爾為什么沒有被踢出去？經(jīng)我觀察，他很懂得善用有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的人。就好比一位年輕的君王，左右一定要有宰相，這些幾乎到了退休的年齡的宰相被他找來，輔佐他的事業(yè)。94年有一位原本是在摩托羅拉里主導(dǎo)六希格瑪?shù)念I(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，被戴爾延攬進(jìn)公司，他把這個(gè)觀念帶到戴爾來，成為戴爾很大的助力。他懂得運(yùn)用心理戰(zhàn)略，他所發(fā)布的所有對內(nèi)對外的命令通常都用OCEO（戴爾的一個(gè)管理委員會(huì)）的名義發(fā)，讓大家了解他是多么的專業(yè)，不是獨(dú)裁，不是他一個(gè)人在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)這個(gè)公司，而是OCEO在領(lǐng)導(dǎo)這個(gè)公司。實(shí)質(zhì)上我們也注意到了，他的這些策略擬定以及在公司管理方面也都是深思熟慮的，從95年到現(xiàn)在很少看到他犯策略上的錯(cuò)誤。他自己寫了一本書，里面也敘述了幾個(gè)小故事，怎么樣不犯第二次的錯(cuò)誤，所有的錯(cuò)誤都能深刻地吸取其中的含義、經(jīng)驗(yàn)、教訓(xùn)，轉(zhuǎn)化為未來成長的動(dòng)力。

92年的時(shí)候486電腦剛剛開始風(fēng)行，很多人認(rèn)為從這時(shí)候開始PC要迅速進(jìn)入家用市場，因?yàn)镻C的銷售量大量提升，PC的價(jià)格大幅度下降。人們買PC的習(xí)慣當(dāng)然是到大賣場去買，看看型號、看看產(chǎn)品，左比右比才會(huì)把產(chǎn)品帶到家去，這是一般消費(fèi)者的采購方法，這跟直銷市場是格格不入的，戴爾不在店面賣、不在賣場賣，一定不能有所斬獲。當(dāng)然戴爾也動(dòng)搖了，于是就有了當(dāng)時(shí)的三家渠道，可是只不過幾個(gè)月就發(fā)現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表不對了，原來獲利情況都還很穩(wěn)定，但是進(jìn)入了間接銷售的市場反而把利潤拉下來了，我們的常年顧問就給我們做了一些企業(yè)診斷，結(jié)論是你們所有的模式統(tǒng)統(tǒng)是按照直銷模式來設(shè)計(jì)的，所以你的渠道銷售不會(huì)好。這以后戴爾毅然決然堅(jiān)持直銷，從那時(shí)開始一直堅(jiān)持到今天，從此不再搖擺了。一朝被蛇咬、十年怕井繩。

現(xiàn)在戴爾的各項(xiàng)產(chǎn)品線在市場上不是第一也是第二。臺灣筆記本計(jì)算機(jī)的生產(chǎn)、制造是執(zhí)世界牛耳的，高達(dá)60-70％以上的產(chǎn)品都是臺灣設(shè)計(jì)制造的，其中每4臺就有1臺就掛著戴爾的品牌行銷全球。今天有這么一個(gè)輝煌的成績，但是當(dāng)初卻有一個(gè)相當(dāng)戲劇化的轉(zhuǎn)折過程。因?yàn)?993年的時(shí)候戴爾曾經(jīng)完全退出筆記本計(jì)算機(jī)市場。當(dāng)時(shí)臺北采購處剛成立了一年多，人員很少，6-7人左右，美國的采購部也非常積極。那時(shí)候毛毛躁躁，非常急功近利，知道臺灣486計(jì)算機(jī)興盛，知道臺灣筆記本廠商進(jìn)展神速，所以到處去做SOURCING的工作，同一個(gè)時(shí)間四個(gè)不同產(chǎn)品、四個(gè)不同廠商，他們看著都愛，所以在同一個(gè)時(shí)間與四個(gè)廠商都訂下采購合約。以今天戴爾電腦嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)墓こ桃�求來講那是不可能的事情，一定會(huì)產(chǎn)生很大的問題，但是當(dāng)時(shí)我們沒有那么警覺。還好來了一位新的副總裁，他是從蘋果電腦加入戴爾的，蘋果電腦一直對工程的要求非常嚴(yán)格、嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)，以他的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來看，這簡直是自討苦吃。所以我們對外宣布說要重整旗鼓重新再來。當(dāng)時(shí)華爾街對戴爾的表現(xiàn)非常壓抑，他說筆記本電腦是一個(gè)新的潮流，是未來產(chǎn)品的主軸，戴爾這么貿(mào)然地退出這個(gè)市場，以后還進(jìn)得來嗎？當(dāng)時(shí)戴爾的股價(jià)在一個(gè)星期內(nèi)由40元跌到15元錢，華爾街是非常殘酷的。但是經(jīng)過九個(gè)月個(gè)時(shí)間后我們重新推出一個(gè)新的產(chǎn)品，從此以后扶搖直上，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)教訓(xùn)，戴爾發(fā)展了一套過程管理。這對公司來講尤其是對采購處來講是一個(gè)深刻的教訓(xùn)，但我們從教訓(xùn)里學(xué)到要怎么樣把工作做得更嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)。

1998年9月21日臺灣發(fā)生了一次大地震，大地震當(dāng)然不是戴爾的錯(cuò)，但戴爾的確在其中學(xué)到了一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)，無論是人為因素還是組織管理、經(jīng)營方面，戴爾在里面還是可以學(xué)到一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)。921大地震發(fā)生以后，全球的IT產(chǎn)業(yè)都很緊張，因?yàn)橛泻芏郔T產(chǎn)業(yè)使用的配件都是由臺灣的臺積電和聯(lián)電這兩家大廠生產(chǎn)制造的。一發(fā)生大地震，在生產(chǎn)過程中的芯片一部分受到損失，一段時(shí)間以后產(chǎn)能就開始出現(xiàn)出現(xiàn)問題。所以我們成立了一個(gè)小組，開始做調(diào)查，調(diào)查影響到我們的生產(chǎn)幾個(gè)星期之后會(huì)發(fā)生，發(fā)生的程度會(huì)有多高，材料短缺的情況會(huì)怎么樣。這個(gè)小組后來就成了一個(gè)常設(shè)組織，如果對于某個(gè)產(chǎn)品，短缺的材料有可能在任何情況下造成生產(chǎn)不順或者生產(chǎn)材料斷線的，他都要建議給采購部，增加一個(gè)供貨商的來源。從這一點(diǎn)可以看出，無論是大是小，凡是可以影響到公司營運(yùn)順暢的事，都會(huì)拿來作為一個(gè)教訓(xùn)，都會(huì)深刻地反映這些從里面學(xué)來的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

各位生活在海峽這一岸，可能對那一岸的廠商名字不是很了解，在那一岸所有跟戴爾做生意的廠商統(tǒng)統(tǒng)都是最好的廠商，比如說微創(chuàng)、廣達(dá)電腦、人寶電腦、臺達(dá)電子、光寶電子、飛利浦。戴爾電腦對伙伴關(guān)系非常重視，不會(huì)每年報(bào)價(jià)，一看哪邊便宜就哪邊買，他非常注重伙伴的關(guān)系，也因?yàn)槿绱烁�伙伴之間都是雙贏的關(guān)系。戴爾雖然要求非常嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)，但是不會(huì)嚴(yán)苛。

對客戶滿意程度特別重視。這里有一個(gè)表可供各位參考。

所謂TBR，是專業(yè)的IT產(chǎn)業(yè)采購承辦人員，就是大公司里面負(fù)責(zé)IT產(chǎn)品的采購人員，他對使用品牌的一種印象調(diào)查。橫軸代表所采購產(chǎn)品品質(zhì)程度、質(zhì)量水準(zhǔn)，縱軸是它對使用品牌的忠誠度以及滿意度。右上角代表品質(zhì)又好，使用者也對戴爾非常的忠誠，不會(huì)任意改變采購對象；最下端是品質(zhì)不理想，客戶也是游移不定，隨時(shí)會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)換。針對這張表我作一個(gè)簡單的結(jié)論，戴爾極端重視產(chǎn)品品質(zhì)以及客戶忠誠度。到什么程度呢？我舉一個(gè)例子，大家可以舉一反三。 戴爾里面有一個(gè)副總裁，他的作用就是不斷設(shè)想各種可能的方案，怎么樣去抓住客戶的心，怎么樣讓客戶一粘上就跑不掉。戴爾也增加一些技術(shù)，一旦采購我們的產(chǎn)品就是互相綁在一起跑不掉了。一般客戶都了解，你要買50臺電腦，30臺要怎么配備，20臺要怎么配備，我們完全照你的要求做，你要什么樣的軟件，我們幫你做好，甚至你的財(cái)產(chǎn)標(biāo)簽我們幫你貼好。所以公司里負(fù)責(zé)IT產(chǎn)品的人員只要登記好數(shù)量以及財(cái)產(chǎn)編號，直接發(fā)給員工用就可以了。已經(jīng)做到那么細(xì)的程度，換句話說，已經(jīng)把客戶寵壞了，客戶也就跑不掉了。這在平常也許我們不會(huì)想到那么深，但是戴爾這么大的公司的確可以做到這么細(xì)的地方。

2000年年中，戴爾推出了一款新的筆記本計(jì)算機(jī)，那款是適合企業(yè)用戶的，我剛才說過在最短的時(shí)間內(nèi)可以收集到足夠的品質(zhì)資料，這就是一個(gè)驗(yàn)證。產(chǎn)品賣出去以后，來自加州的一個(gè)大學(xué)反映，我們買了一部分這個(gè)機(jī)種，發(fā)現(xiàn)它有問題。因?yàn)榇髮W(xué)里面的用戶在課堂和辦公室里進(jìn)進(jìn)出出，機(jī)蓋的關(guān)合很頻繁，他說這本計(jì)算機(jī)開合幾次以后就撐不住了，這個(gè)面板就會(huì)倒下去。我們的工程部就做了一些分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)鉸煉是有技術(shù)的問題，再經(jīng)過科學(xué)的計(jì)算預(yù)估大概有30％要回收。可是在美國一旦不良，一臺臺退回來，運(yùn)費(fèi)、人工，加上零件的成本，每一件產(chǎn)品的回收成本要200-300美金。但這時(shí)候戴爾的直銷優(yōu)勢又看出來了，因?yàn)槭侵变N，我們馬上查出來過去所賣的對象都在哪里，哪一個(gè)客戶買多少臺，在資料里都非常清楚。我們組織了一個(gè)小組，讓他們巡回服務(wù)一遍，幫所有買這個(gè)機(jī)種的客戶更換零件。這樣一趟服務(wù)下來，達(dá)到幾個(gè)效果：第一，集中服務(wù)，成本大幅度降低，你可以用最低的成本把這些筆記本計(jì)算機(jī)修好，第二，客戶非常滿意，他說戴爾能夠那么貼心地幫我們維修這些計(jì)算機(jī)，對戴爾的滿意程度大幅度提升。第三，OEM制造商也非常高興。如果我們要等OEM制造商一臺臺回來換，他們要負(fù)擔(dān)的成本是非常高的，我們主動(dòng)出擊幫他們修好，在成本方面都控制得非常低。

對于海爾集團(tuán)的張瑞敏先生我非常有興趣。重視品質(zhì)的公司才能生存，他親手砸碎76臺電冰箱的經(jīng)典案例是海爾邁向成功的第一步。他使海爾所有員工學(xué)會(huì)了品質(zhì)第一、品質(zhì)至上的觀念。我個(gè)人認(rèn)為這可以說是中西典范的相互輝映?

重視均衡地成長。它不是盲目地追求利潤，除了利潤以外同時(shí)要求三個(gè)東西。戴爾的季報(bào)表里總會(huì)出現(xiàn)金三角，一個(gè)是流動(dòng)比率是多少、成長率是多少，你的獲利能力有多少，這三個(gè)極度要求均衡，絕對不能失衡掉。曾經(jīng)有一次印象我非常深刻，歐洲的一個(gè)公司毛利率將近30％，結(jié)果過了一個(gè)禮拜，OCEO就發(fā)出一個(gè)通知，說我們要檢討這件事情。因?yàn)槟阌?0％的獲利率存在，表示你這里的定價(jià)不夠精準(zhǔn)、積極，在賺取高額的利潤的同時(shí)也失掉了一些業(yè)務(wù)的機(jī)會(huì)。還有Self-funding，這一點(diǎn)外界的人可能不大了解，這是在戴爾內(nèi)被稱為最甜美的一塊。剛才我提過產(chǎn)品零庫存，產(chǎn)品一出廠就直接到客戶手上，客戶付款給戴爾的時(shí)間是45天，戴爾付給零售廠商也是45天，這邊很短的時(shí)間就出去了，沒有什么營運(yùn)資金的積壓，他的資金周轉(zhuǎn)時(shí)間大概4-5天。很多企業(yè)在成長的過程當(dāng)中需要增加營運(yùn)資金來應(yīng)付他的周轉(zhuǎn)，但是戴爾就不大需要，更妙的是，除了這80-85％是企業(yè)用途，另外15-20％之間是end user，他們的采購是通過Internet的，換句話說他們采購的同時(shí)信用卡已經(jīng)刷了，戴爾賣出產(chǎn)品的同時(shí)已經(jīng)收到付款了，之后戴爾再付給零件商，所以這15％是收到以后再付，這在全球企業(yè)當(dāng)中很難找到這樣一種企業(yè)模式。

我個(gè)人判斷，95年以前戴爾也是一個(gè)沒有什么特別的地方的電腦公司，除了營運(yùn)的地方比較特殊，制定策略比較精準(zhǔn)以外也沒有什么特別的地方，但是95年有了一個(gè)分水嶺。95年大家都開始意識到Internet會(huì)對人類的生活甚至對相關(guān)產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)生很大的影響，因?yàn)樯暇W(wǎng)的人多了，所以跟Internet有關(guān)的東西需求量都會(huì)增加，但是這一塊門檻是比較低的，是競爭非常激烈的一塊領(lǐng)域；但同時(shí)Internet風(fēng)行以后，會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些ISP、IDC、ASP，為了要應(yīng)付Internet整體會(huì)成長一塊，這一塊就是競爭門檻比較高的企業(yè)產(chǎn)品。1995年戴爾定好這個(gè)策略以后一直沒有優(yōu)先發(fā)展低價(jià)電腦，戴爾選擇了門檻高而獲利較佳的企業(yè)產(chǎn)品，在這一塊很快就占領(lǐng)了全美第一全球第二的地位。在長期競爭很激烈的市場里面，也許在某些產(chǎn)品里面增長率比較低，但是門檻比較高這一塊增長率一定是很高的。

大家知道在賣場賣有什么效果。賣場賣是直接面對消費(fèi)者，但是這些采購行為也有一部分是沖動(dòng)性地采購、沖動(dòng)性地購買，看著喜歡就買回家。在美國，對消費(fèi)者的保護(hù)是沒有條件的，如果這個(gè)產(chǎn)品用著不滿意在一定的時(shí)間內(nèi)退回來，是100％無條件退貨的。在市場上零售的產(chǎn)品有很高的退貨率，這個(gè)退貨回來的產(chǎn)品依據(jù)法律是不能重新包裝當(dāng)作新品來賣的，要當(dāng)作次級品在很大的折扣下來賣，這是很大的損失。戴爾避開了這一塊。另外，在賣場是賣給很多沒有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的使用者，他們買回家以后問題一大堆，會(huì)不停地打電話來問，戴爾避開了大賣場也就避開了沒有經(jīng)驗(yàn)的使用者。使用網(wǎng)絡(luò)下訂單的這種人，要求的檔次比較高，所以賣出去的產(chǎn)品通常是比較穩(wěn)定的，也避開了無理退還的動(dòng)作，所以在這方面產(chǎn)生了一些過濾的機(jī)制。我們平常會(huì)看到戴爾在打價(jià)格戰(zhàn)爭，戴爾在不斷地爭取市場，但是在幕后到底有哪些這樣的成功，是特別值得我們大家去探討的。 徹底地運(yùn)用網(wǎng)絡(luò)可以帶來一個(gè)很重要的商機(jī)，當(dāng)然最有名的就是電子商務(wù)。從1996年下半年開始戴爾把產(chǎn)品在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上銷售，但并不是以電子商務(wù)為主，最主要一塊是專屬網(wǎng)站，就是采購人員或者經(jīng)理人員、IT人員可以通過專屬網(wǎng)站直接看到他跟戴爾之間的合約關(guān)系、采購關(guān)系、定價(jià)，還有多少臺等等情況，這些都可以查的到，完全是自動(dòng)化的一種互動(dòng)。最終成長率已經(jīng)達(dá)到60％，這是一個(gè)沒有時(shí)差，沒有距離的一種互動(dòng)，所有的資料都能做最及時(shí)最精確的統(tǒng)計(jì)，沒有經(jīng)過任何人工統(tǒng)計(jì)，你要怎么樣分類、怎么樣排序都可以達(dá)到最精確，可以達(dá)到很多增長率。我們常說如果達(dá)到90％甚至達(dá)到95％的話，戴爾就已經(jīng)有了金剛不壞之身了，最大幅度地節(jié)省人工，效率和制度性的作用都發(fā)揮到最高極限了。1997年3月的一個(gè)晚上戴爾的交易金額達(dá)到100萬美金，到今天為止每一天的營業(yè)額達(dá)到6500萬美金。6500萬美金相當(dāng)于5億人民幣，5億人民幣相當(dāng)于一個(gè)中型企業(yè)每年的營業(yè)額。

談到組織文化方面，據(jù)我個(gè)人的觀察，戴爾的高階領(lǐng)導(dǎo)精英應(yīng)該是通才，常常會(huì)調(diào)動(dòng)，中間的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部比較少調(diào)動(dòng)，每個(gè)人把自己的工作做好就可以了，高階經(jīng)常會(huì)輪調(diào)，輪調(diào)就會(huì)產(chǎn)生一些動(dòng)力。我個(gè)人在戴爾計(jì)算機(jī)工作11年，我的老板換了12任，有9個(gè)不同的人當(dāng)了我12任的老板，這之間的互動(dòng)是相當(dāng)頻密的。我們有一位從蘋果計(jì)算機(jī)加入戴爾的筆記本計(jì)算機(jī)事業(yè)部副總，兩年以后就調(diào)到日本去當(dāng)日本分公司總經(jīng)理去了，日本分公司總經(jīng)理跟產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)完全沒有關(guān)系，他要做市場、銷售、策略等等，兩年之后又回到美國總公司擔(dān)任采購副總裁，那個(gè)工作擔(dān)任了一年半又調(diào)回一個(gè)新的產(chǎn)品線，他擔(dān)任事業(yè)部的首長，現(xiàn)在他又回到筆記本電腦，繞了一大圈，在九年之內(nèi)輪調(diào)了不同的工作職務(wù)，可以說他已經(jīng)是一個(gè)種子成員，因?yàn)樗�見多識廣，經(jīng)歷過很多以后，最高階對他的能力都已經(jīng)相當(dāng)肯定。

戴爾也跟GE一樣，確實(shí)執(zhí)行了一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的考核制度。這是我個(gè)人認(rèn)為一向比較痛苦的地方，我心比較軟一點(diǎn)，每一年要挑出10％的職員，要給他們比較嚴(yán)厲的要求，GE跟戴爾是很嚴(yán)格地執(zhí)行這一項(xiàng)考核的。這從某個(gè)層面來看是有點(diǎn)冷血，但是從另外一個(gè)角度是賞罰分明，他對前十名給予的獎(jiǎng)賞非常優(yōu)厚，但是對最低的十名也要求地很嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)。很多成功的企業(yè)里面都不允許和稀泥、打混仗，這也是戴爾能夠成長到這么高的原因之一。

從組織調(diào)動(dòng)里面我發(fā)現(xiàn)了一些效果。第一是預(yù)防組織老化，促進(jìn)了上下溝通。同一批人互相的了解如果很深，自然就減低了他們的互動(dòng)，可是如果換一個(gè)新老板來，他對這一批部署不了解，很急切地要了解他們，開會(huì)的次數(shù)，甚至一對一溝通的次數(shù)就會(huì)很多。新上來的主管也會(huì)想，我以前管那個(gè)產(chǎn)品線，現(xiàn)在管這個(gè)產(chǎn)品線，對我來講是很陌生的，我要趕快學(xué)習(xí)，學(xué)會(huì)新產(chǎn)品里面有哪些不了解的地方。既然每個(gè)人能在高階當(dāng)中輪調(diào)，他自然而然有一種榮譽(yù)心，他要做得比上屆更好，所以每一個(gè)新官上來都會(huì)有一個(gè)變動(dòng)，要把過去精華的部分留下來，因?yàn)闆]有包袱，他要把不好的地方馬上改掉。在高度成長的公司里面，不允許陳腐化，因?yàn)殛惛�化�?dǎo)致競爭力降低，就沒有那種沖勁了。

邁克爾戴爾個(gè)人的特質(zhì)是公司成功的重要因素之一。他常常在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上東逛西逛，看到什么比較新鮮的產(chǎn)品或者廣告做得很好的公司，就發(fā)一些資料給我們，要我們?nèi)ゲ�，結(jié)果就浪費(fèi)很多時(shí)間，后來我們都說這些都跟我們門不當(dāng)戶不對，產(chǎn)品跟我們也不相關(guān)，我們有必要花那么多時(shí)間在這上面嗎？有一天我跟他講這個(gè)事，他說我們已經(jīng)在巔峰，我們不見得要跳到懸崖底下去，但是我們要經(jīng)�？匆豢磻已碌紫掠惺裁礀|西。這一點(diǎn)跟張瑞敏先生提出的一樣，"永遠(yuǎn)戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)兢兢、永遠(yuǎn)如履薄冰。"東西呼應(yīng)。

供應(yīng)鏈管理

要談所謂供應(yīng)鏈管理我們不得不稍微理順一下過去國際大廠在亞洲區(qū)甚至在臺灣采購的一些演化過程。因?yàn)槲易约涸谕馍汤锩鎺Я?3年，可以講經(jīng)歷過好幾個(gè)年代的演化。70-80年代在臺灣的主要生產(chǎn)廠商大多是外商投資，象飛利浦，生產(chǎn)電阻、電容、簡單的電晶體，慢慢的開始有一些臺商出現(xiàn)，他們大部分人在外商里學(xué)了一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)、技術(shù)，自己出來創(chuàng)業(yè)，當(dāng)時(shí)沒有什么所謂的工程人員。當(dāng)時(shí)我在RCA的采購部，對臺灣的采購大部分都是按圖施工，沒有什么太高深的能力，那時(shí)候的采購可以說在品質(zhì)、價(jià)格、交期這三項(xiàng)上。90年代臺灣的產(chǎn)業(yè)已經(jīng)升級轉(zhuǎn)型了，進(jìn)入這一階段就是成品的提供，不光是零件的提供，這些OEM/ODM扮演的角色更加深化，包括研發(fā)能力、制造能力、財(cái)務(wù)能力，甚至遠(yuǎn)到國外制作發(fā)貨倉庫，這已經(jīng)變成被選擇的條件之一。2000年以后全球化的趨勢越來越明顯，也可以講正式進(jìn)入所謂的價(jià)值鏈分工。戴爾的工作不再是產(chǎn)品的設(shè)計(jì)和制造，而是市場，他去研究新的產(chǎn)品應(yīng)該長什么樣子，他把新產(chǎn)品定義好以后，后面的階段幾乎都由上游的合作廠商來做。他們除了做前面講的這些研發(fā)、制造以外，又增加了很多價(jià)值鏈分工的工具，比如說全球布局，甚至慢慢多了一項(xiàng)，逐水草而居。這些國際大廠因?yàn)橛嵪⒘魍ǚ浅？焖�、非常方便，所以國際大廠不光處于被動(dòng)由廠商來主導(dǎo)，而是主動(dòng)要求廠商，你的廠應(yīng)該設(shè)到蘇州，你的廠應(yīng)該設(shè)到張江，你的廠應(yīng)該設(shè)到昆山，因?yàn)槟抢锉容^適合整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的運(yùn)作，他們非常了解在大陸設(shè)廠、在制造業(yè)為主國家設(shè)廠的大致環(huán)境，所以在設(shè)廠地點(diǎn)方面也配合客戶的要求，所以在前年開始就發(fā)現(xiàn)了很多大廠包括戴爾在內(nèi)開始主導(dǎo)臺商到大陸來設(shè)廠的腳步快慢以及地點(diǎn)選擇。 這是廣義的供應(yīng)鏈管理，在大型外商的采購策略里面可以大致上這么說。談到供應(yīng)鏈管理，像戴爾的IPO就是亞太區(qū)供應(yīng)鏈管理分公司，實(shí)際上它執(zhí)行的動(dòng)作并不是訂單大小、訂單流程、訂單交期怎么排，這些過程事實(shí)上由于電子商務(wù)的快速、方便，根本跟距離沒有關(guān)系了。全球有六個(gè)廠，可以自己直接溝通，在電子商務(wù)上面下訂單、跟催、調(diào)整，這些都不需要當(dāng)?shù)豂PO的服務(wù)了，IPO的真正工作內(nèi)容反而在這方面，廣義的供應(yīng)鏈管理。

再一個(gè)是在制造方面的嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)程度。

你不光提供材料生產(chǎn)，還要負(fù)責(zé)后面的，所以你做的生意越大，你的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)資金就變得更高。很多公司都在往上推，當(dāng)然這不是壓榨廠商，因?yàn)橥�上移的話通常效率�?huì)更高。財(cái)務(wù)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)能力變成合格供應(yīng)商的一個(gè)必備條件之一。

戴爾通常不希望供應(yīng)廠商只做我一家生意，通常我們開個(gè)玩笑說，如果這個(gè)女孩子只有一個(gè)人在追，她可能條件不見得很好，如果追她的男朋友很多，可能她的條件很好，戴爾也一樣，戴爾認(rèn)為我們的客戶廠商如果只做戴爾一家，我們覺得他的眼界不夠?qū)�，他不見得�?jīng)常跟市場能夠保持很密切的聯(lián)系，你同時(shí)做戴爾也做HP、蘋果、IBM表示你對未來的把握很好，這樣的廠商反而是戴爾愿意合作的對象。

對于合作廠商，邁克爾戴爾每年會(huì)跟他們進(jìn)行一次很深的交談，了解整個(gè)公司的動(dòng)態(tài)，了解整個(gè)公司的經(jīng)營管理理念，以及對未來的看法。這些都是供應(yīng)鏈管理的部分。供應(yīng)鏈管理絕對不是狹義的字面上所謂的只是物流、訂單這些，廣義的供應(yīng)鏈管理真正落實(shí)在IPO上的還是很多的。

我91年進(jìn)入戴爾，早期我的觀念沒有那么深刻，也沒有那么成熟，我?guī)Я艘慌�美國的工程師來臺灣參觀工廠、選擇工廠，有一天我得到一個(gè)很深刻的印象，這也是一個(gè)很值得談的故事。我們?nèi)�參觀了一家的制造商，因?yàn)檫@個(gè)制造商的總經(jīng)理剛好跟我是交通大學(xué)同屆畢業(yè)的，住的同一個(gè)宿舍，大學(xué)時(shí)候很熟，他的業(yè)務(wù)副總又是我的同班同學(xué)，所以上上下下都比較熟悉，所以講話就比較直接，不必拐彎抹角，參觀完以后我們公司的一個(gè)工程師給他們提出很多意見和看法，基本上的看法就是，這個(gè)公司有很多需要改進(jìn)的地方。但是在開會(huì)前的幾分鐘的空檔，廠商的副總跟我們說，你們公司這么挑剔有必要嗎，我們公司每個(gè)月在美國賣六萬臺，客戶評價(jià)非常好，現(xiàn)在以O(shè)EM的身份進(jìn)來，你們提出很多很高的要求，這樣徒然增加我們的成本而已，你們覺得有必要嗎？我的立場也是很接近他的，我說對啊，他們明明做的出來，為什么要用我們的方法做呢，這樣的話不是徒然增加他們的成本嗎？我跟我的同事講，他跟我說，你們公司就好比一個(gè)中國餐廳，我進(jìn)到中國餐廳里面點(diǎn)了一個(gè)菜上來，菜非常可口，賓主盡歡，但是我進(jìn)入廚房以后覺得不大對勁，菜做得好是看廚師，他覺得這個(gè)菜味道對了就拿上來，如果今天挨老板罵了會(huì)影響到他的情緒，這也會(huì)影響到這道菜。我現(xiàn)在要的不是中國餐廳而是麥當(dāng)勞，麥當(dāng)勞的每一片漢堡肉厚度、重量都是一定的，薯?xiàng)l炸幾分幾秒鐘也是一定的，都是有一個(gè)工作標(biāo)準(zhǔn)存在，不一定要大師傅，一個(gè)服務(wù)生兩天就上手，可以做出一模一樣的漢堡來，全球生產(chǎn)一萬個(gè)漢堡都是一樣的品質(zhì)。但是今天這個(gè)做法，我們給你一個(gè)訂單，然后擴(kuò)充生產(chǎn)線，生產(chǎn)出來的東西能不能跟第一個(gè)線做出的一樣，所以品質(zhì)控制就是一大問題。他這個(gè)比喻我覺得很恰當(dāng)，而且很深刻，聽完以后我大為心服，我的同學(xué)也搖頭贊賞。那時(shí)候國際采購組才六個(gè)人，但從此以后我在擴(kuò)展的過程當(dāng)中永遠(yuǎn)把品控人員放在第一位，品控人員在國際采購里面的配備超過一半。尤其在這個(gè)社會(huì)上，任何一個(gè)退貨，1%-2％的退貨都可以，3％的退貨就可能會(huì)讓公司倒閉。

我常常把海爾跟戴爾進(jìn)行對比。兩個(gè)公司都是1984年開始，兩個(gè)公司都在高速成長，都成為業(yè)界的典范。兩位老總都沒有很高的學(xué)歷，邁克爾.戴爾是大學(xué)一年級，張瑞敏先生也是后來很多學(xué)校才贈(zèng)予他很多榮譽(yù)學(xué)位的。

剛才講的是廣義供應(yīng)鏈管理的第一步，怎么樣去挑選我們的廠商。下一步就是我們很重視的共同成長了。一個(gè)廠商被選擇好，他并不是從此就一勞永逸，安然地做我們的生意了，要不斷地精進(jìn)。戴爾要不斷地成長、要不斷地進(jìn)步，供應(yīng)商也是一樣要不斷進(jìn)步。我們有一個(gè)執(zhí)行層面的團(tuán)隊(duì)，針對供應(yīng)商的對口單位，來評估你這一季的表現(xiàn)，哪些是好的，哪些是不好的，同樣是做芯片，三個(gè)廠商里面排名第幾。還有就是老板跟老板之間的對話，談公司的策略、未來合作的方向，這些通常都是一年至少一次。 70年代時(shí)候日商在臺灣有活動(dòng)，但最大的印象就是日商通常留一手，有些東西不愿意教你。戴爾完全不一樣，戴爾是傾囊相授，通常我們有好的東西都毫不吝嗇地傳授給供應(yīng)商。有一次在IPO的研討會(huì)上，很多人認(rèn)為跟大廠做生意是食之無味，棄之可惜，因?yàn)楸粔嚎s的很緊。像某些主機(jī)板生產(chǎn)廠商，自己有渠道銷售，同時(shí)也是戴爾的OEM,我給他們的看法是，你千萬不要認(rèn)為食之無味、棄之可惜，因?yàn)槟愀�這些國際大廠的常年往來，就會(huì)像一個(gè)家庭醫(yī)生一樣，不斷地幫你改善體質(zhì)，不斷地幫你完善，千萬不要低估了大型OEM帶來的一些價(jià)值。

我剛剛談到了，戴爾特別重視制造引導(dǎo)這一塊，但是研發(fā)與設(shè)計(jì)我也要談一談。以前在設(shè)計(jì)方面，你只要把產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)好出來，一般來講不會(huì)太挑剔設(shè)計(jì)的內(nèi)涵、設(shè)計(jì)本身的品質(zhì)，但是隨著這幾年來的演化、演進(jìn)，戴爾這個(gè)大廠對于OEM廠商的要求慢慢深化，DFx，x就是一個(gè)變數(shù)值，可以代表M、Q、C、S。首先要求你這個(gè)產(chǎn)品的制造性是很好的，不要搞了半天搞不出來，很難生產(chǎn)制造，這是不行的。慢慢演變到Q，在設(shè)計(jì)當(dāng)中要避免掉容易發(fā)生品質(zhì)問題的地方。C，在制造當(dāng)中對設(shè)計(jì)的采用以及模具的開發(fā)不要采用高成本的，以前通常是曲高和寡、精工打造，在設(shè)計(jì)當(dāng)中就要考慮到他以后打開機(jī)器是不是用最小的力氣。

現(xiàn)在我要特別強(qiáng)調(diào)一下，在筆記本電腦上面學(xué)到的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。對Phase Review Process有什么樣的要求。戴爾的任何一個(gè)產(chǎn)品從開發(fā)設(shè)計(jì)到產(chǎn)品的推出都有很嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)倪^程，目標(biāo)就是在每一個(gè)過程當(dāng)中都有一個(gè)PRP，比如說現(xiàn)在定義產(chǎn)品，要定義到什么程度才能進(jìn)入設(shè)計(jì)階段，設(shè)計(jì)階段完了要得到什么樣的評分才能進(jìn)入試產(chǎn)階段，之后再進(jìn)入量產(chǎn)階段，到上市，上市之后要到這個(gè)產(chǎn)品生命周期的末端，每一道程序都要有一個(gè)評分。因?yàn)橐郧鞍l(fā)生過很多，中間的過程沒有去管制，也許開發(fā)過程拖了太久，結(jié)果到試產(chǎn)又拖了十天，量產(chǎn)又拖了十天，結(jié)果整個(gè)過程拖了六十天，這樣你的市場占有率就降低了很多，如果你晚了半年，最后你拿到的市場占有率就縮小很多。

狹義的供應(yīng)鏈管理

戴爾為什么會(huì)這么優(yōu)化他的供應(yīng)鏈，其實(shí)里面有幾項(xiàng)重要因素。每一臺在生產(chǎn)線生產(chǎn)的東西都是"名花有主"，通常出來之后就送到客戶手上。一般所謂的鏈條式生產(chǎn)線，一臺機(jī)器放在生產(chǎn)線一頭慢慢移動(dòng)，每個(gè)操作員在他那一站就加入自己所負(fù)責(zé)的零件，一直到生產(chǎn)線的末端。這樣的Line Production通常適合同一規(guī)格大量生產(chǎn)，速度快、效率高，但是彈性比較差。戴爾全球的生產(chǎn)都是cell production，不是line。他每一個(gè)工作區(qū)的鏈條跑過來并不是直接穿過去，而是轉(zhuǎn)個(gè)彎到我這個(gè)區(qū)域里來，這個(gè)區(qū)域里擺了各種各樣的零件，有不同規(guī)格的，每一臺機(jī)臺上面就是一張機(jī)器的要求規(guī)格，它的要求可能跟下一臺不一樣，每一個(gè)批量就是一臺，這個(gè)操作員就要了解這臺機(jī)器要什么樣的CPU，要裝什么樣的軟件，等它再回到生產(chǎn)線上時(shí)已經(jīng)變成一個(gè)與眾不同的機(jī)器，他可能跟前一臺和后一臺都不一樣。這就是最大的特色，戴爾電腦的客制化程度里面最與眾不同的地方，也可以講是他整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈里面與眾不同的地方。

下一個(gè)不同的地方，所有的廠商因?yàn)楦�戴爾有長期合作的關(guān)系，因此所有的合作廠商都是門當(dāng)戶對的，都有足夠的財(cái)務(wù)能力來支撐他們跟戴爾之間的商業(yè)往來，所有這些廠商在我們的六大廠區(qū)都設(shè)有他們的循環(huán)式倉庫，廠商有義務(wù)根據(jù)合約保留兩個(gè)禮拜的存貨。只有少數(shù)的象CPU這樣的零件戴爾才有庫存，這是戴爾才會(huì)有4-5天庫存的原因之一。

所有的廠商都有一個(gè)很大的頭痛的地方，產(chǎn)品到了周期后要留下來多少，或者說我們該結(jié)束的時(shí)候還有很大一部分庫存。我們有一個(gè)很重要的績效指針，如果產(chǎn)品在生命周期末端有太多的庫存，不可容忍的庫存的話，這對管理來講就是很大的一個(gè)問題。

我把剛剛的敘述圖象化。某一天九點(diǎn)鐘到廠的有哪些東西，十一點(diǎn)鐘到廠的有哪些東西，非常精密地描述了貨物的內(nèi)容，這個(gè)貨柜一靠上碼頭門一打開才算戴爾的庫存，之前不算是戴爾的庫存。這里面是配料，這一端描述的是跟配料之間的關(guān)系。另一端，一旦生產(chǎn)完到這邊包裝產(chǎn)品之后就可以直接運(yùn)到客戶手上。這個(gè)材料在這里停留的時(shí)間通常是非常短的，只有幾個(gè)小時(shí)，通常從零件變成產(chǎn)品，所以真正停留在戴爾里面的時(shí)間只有幾個(gè)小時(shí)而已，這跟上一頁是一樣的內(nèi)容，比較圖象化，這是他來的時(shí)候靠向卸貨碼頭。這已經(jīng)是相當(dāng)詳細(xì)地描述了戴爾怎么樣減少庫存，優(yōu)化供應(yīng)鏈。

剛才我們敘述了廣義的供應(yīng)商管理到狹義的供應(yīng)鏈管理的內(nèi)涵，各位有什么問題可以共同探討。謝謝！

經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展的新方向

--- 演講全文 （根據(jù)錄音整理并翻譯，演講者本人和ＣＥＩＢＳ版權(quán)所有。如需轉(zhuǎn)載，必須先與ＣＥＩＢＳ市場及公共關(guān)系部取得聯(lián)系。）

奚愷元 [簡介]

中歐國際工商學(xué)院行為科學(xué)研究中心主任

芝加哥大學(xué)管理學(xué)院終身教授

2002年12月26日

2002年，普林斯頓大學(xué)的 Kahneman 教授和喬治梅森大學(xué)的 Smith 共同獲得諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)。Kahneman 教授是一位心理學(xué)家，他和他的合作者 Tverskey 的研究成果從很多方面證實(shí)了傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的一些基礎(chǔ)理論存在的錯(cuò)誤。我的演講主要圍繞 Kahneman 的理論及其影響，針對新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的修正以及經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展的新方向做一些闡述。

我主要講新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)在以下三個(gè)方面的區(qū)別：首先，在對人的行為的假設(shè)方面，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)認(rèn)為人是理性的，而新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)認(rèn)為人是有限理性的。其次，在理論模式上，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是規(guī)范性的，新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是描述性的。最后，從研究目的來講，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)主要研究如何增加人們的財(cái)富，但是我認(rèn)為一個(gè)新的研究方向是研究如何從根本上增加人的幸福，這里的幸福是一個(gè)廣義的概念。

傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)　　新方向　　

假設(shè)：　　人是理性的　　人是有限理性的　　

理論：　　規(guī)范性的　　描述性的　　

研究目標(biāo)：　　財(cái)富　　廣義的幸�！　�

理性和有限理性

傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)認(rèn)為，人都是有理性的，關(guān)于理性，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)有幾個(gè)基本的假設(shè)，比如傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)相信，對于好的東西和壞的東西，人們總是愿意為好的支付更多的錢。早在上個(gè)世紀(jì)50年代，Simon 就首先對理性人這個(gè)基本假設(shè)發(fā)出了質(zhì)疑，他提出了有限理性這個(gè)概念。但是一直到了Kahneman 和 Tverskey，人們才開始具體地研究人在什么時(shí)候是不理性的，在什么情況下人的行為會(huì)背離理性假設(shè)。

有兩類違反理性假設(shè)的研究。第一類研究說明了人的行為有的時(shí)候會(huì)違背Dominance原則。舉個(gè)例子來說，有兩個(gè)比薩餅，如果他們的配料和口味等其他方面都相同，只不過一個(gè)比另外一個(gè)大一些，那么根據(jù)傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論，人們肯定會(huì)愿意為大的比薩支付更多的錢，起碼為大比薩支付的錢不會(huì)比為小比薩支付的錢少。這就是Dominance原則。但是，在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中，人們在做決策的時(shí)候，并不是看一個(gè)物品的真正價(jià)值，而是用某種容易評價(jià)的線索來進(jìn)行決策，這就是Evaluability的概念。

假定有兩杯哈根達(dá)斯冰淇淋（見圖1），一杯冰淇淋A有7盎司，裝在5盎司的杯子里面，看起來滿滿的；另外一杯冰淇淋B是8盎司，但是裝在10盎司的杯子里，所以看起來冰淇淋裝得不滿�？陀^來講，哪一杯冰淇淋更好呢？按照傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的理論，如果說人們喜歡冰淇淋，那么8盎司的冰淇淋比7盎司的多，如果人們喜歡杯子，那么10盎司的杯子比5盎司的杯子大，所以不管從哪個(gè)角度來說，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)都認(rèn)為人們愿意為冰淇淋B支付更多的錢。但是試驗(yàn)表明，在分別判斷的情況下（也就是人們不能把這兩杯冰淇淋放在一起比較），人們反而愿意為冰淇淋A多付錢。平均來講，人們愿意花2.26美元買冰淇淋A，卻只愿意用1.66美元買冰淇淋B。這就是說，如果這兩杯冰淇淋都標(biāo)價(jià)2美元，那么人們情愿選擇冰淇淋A。這是為什么呢？原因在于，人們在作決策的時(shí)候，通常不是象傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)那樣判斷一個(gè)物品的真正價(jià)值，而是根據(jù)一些比較容易評價(jià)的線索來判斷。在這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)中，人們就是根據(jù)冰淇淋到底滿還是不滿來決定給不同的冰淇淋支付多少錢。這種行為導(dǎo)致的一個(gè)結(jié)果就是人們有可能在一個(gè)差的物品上花費(fèi)更多的錢。

這個(gè)例子雖小，卻有非常廣泛的應(yīng)用。我曾經(jīng)在從中國回美國的時(shí)候給兩個(gè)朋友分別買了兩個(gè)禮物。一個(gè)是400塊的羊毛圍巾，另外是價(jià)值500塊的大衣。把禮物送到兩個(gè)朋友手里之后，兩個(gè)禮物卻帶來了完全不同的結(jié)果。拿到400塊圍巾的朋友非常高興，而且覺得我很慷慨。但是另外一個(gè)拿到500塊大衣的朋友卻不太高興，盡管他拿到的大衣要比圍巾貴。相對大衣來說，圍巾比較便宜，一個(gè)40O塊的圍巾，人們就覺得這個(gè)禮物已經(jīng)足夠好了，它就像在實(shí)驗(yàn)里面那杯比較少但裝得比較滿的冰淇淋；而500塊的大衣就讓人覺得，和其它大衣比起來并不是很昂貴，就好像是比較多但裝得不太滿的冰淇淋。可見人們就是靠比較容易評價(jià)的線索來判斷一個(gè)禮物的好壞的。這個(gè)例子引申出一個(gè)常常被人們所忽視的送禮之道。那就是，在送禮物的時(shí)候，一個(gè)禮物到底值多少錢并不十分重要，重要的是，這個(gè)禮物在它所屬的類別里面是不是昂貴。在一個(gè)不太昂貴的禮物類別選擇一個(gè)比較貴的禮物，要比在一個(gè)比較昂貴的禮物類別里選一個(gè)比較便宜的禮物要好得多。

還有一個(gè)例子可以說明Evaluability概念的重要應(yīng)用。比方說太平上有小島遭受臺風(fēng)侵襲，聯(lián)合國需要決定到底給這個(gè)小島支援多少錢。假設(shè)這個(gè)小島上面有100O戶居民，90%居民的房屋都被臺風(fēng)摧毀了。那么如果你是聯(lián)合國官員，你認(rèn)為聯(lián)合國應(yīng)該支援多少錢呢？但是加入這個(gè)島上有18000戶居民，其中有10%居民的房子被摧毀（你不知道前面一種情況），你這時(shí)認(rèn)為聯(lián)合u應(yīng)該支援多少錢呢？從客觀的角度來講，后面一種情況下的損失更大。但是調(diào)查的結(jié)果，人們覺得在前面一種情況下，聯(lián)合國需要支援1500萬美元，但是在后面一種情況下，人們覺得聯(lián)合國只需要支援1000萬美元。（見表格1）

島A　　島B　　

有1000戶居民　　有18000戶居民　　

90%居民的房子被毀　　10%居民的房子被毀　　

人們覺得聯(lián)合國應(yīng)該支援的金額：　　

島A：1500萬美元　　島B： 1000萬美元　　

（表格1）　　

實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果再一次說明，具體900戶居民和1800戶居民，如果不能互相比較，人們很難知道900戶和1800戶是多是少，但是百分比這個(gè)信息即使不需要比較，人們也很容易地知道90％很多，10 ％很少。這又是一個(gè)Evaluability的例子。

為了說明Evaluability的概念，我再舉一個(gè)關(guān)于餐具的例子。比方說有一家家具店在清倉,你想買一套餐具。你看到一套餐具，有24件，每件都是完好的。那么你愿意支付多少錢買這套餐具呢?另外如果你看到的餐具有40件，這40件中的24件和我們剛剛提到的完全相同，而且也是完好的，此外這套餐具還有8個(gè)杯子和8個(gè)茶托，其中2個(gè)杯子和7個(gè)茶托都已經(jīng)破損了。你愿意為這么餐具支付多少錢呢？（見表格2）

A套餐具（包括24個(gè)餐具）　　B套餐具（包括40個(gè)餐具）　　

8個(gè)菜碟：全部完好　　8個(gè)菜碟：全部完好　　

8個(gè)湯碗：全部完好　　8個(gè)湯碗：全部完好　　

8個(gè)點(diǎn)心碟：全部完好　　8個(gè)點(diǎn)心碟：全部完好　　

8個(gè)杯子：2個(gè)已碎　　

8個(gè)茶托：7個(gè)已碎　　

實(shí)驗(yàn)結(jié)果：人們愿意為這套餐具支付的價(jià)格：　　

A套餐具：33美元　　B套餐具：24美元　　

（表格2）　　

實(shí)驗(yàn)發(fā)現(xiàn)，在分別判斷的時(shí)候（人們只知道其中一套餐具的情況），人們愿意為第一套餐具支付33美元，卻只愿意為第二套餐具支付24美元。這個(gè)結(jié)果再次違反了傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的Dominance假設(shè)。因?yàn)榈诙�套餐具比第一套多出�?個(gè)好的杯子和1個(gè)好的茶托，人們愿意支付的線反而少了。這個(gè)例子也說明，到底24件和31件（9件不計(jì)在內(nèi)）算多算少，如果不互相比較是很難判斷的，但是餐具到底完好無缺還是已經(jīng)破損是很容易判斷的，因此人們?nèi)耘f是依據(jù)容易判斷的線索做出決策。這個(gè)例子其實(shí)很有意思，引申到現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中 甚至可以指導(dǎo)我們的為人之道，那就是情愿一直做好事，做得不多但是沒有做錯(cuò)過，也不要做了很多好事 但是做了一兩件錯(cuò)事。

以上的例子說明了人的行為并不完全遵守傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的Dominance假設(shè)。這是證明人是有限理性的一個(gè)方面。另一方面，許多行為學(xué)的研究表明，錢并不具備傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)所認(rèn)為的替代性。錢的替代性是指錢就是錢，同樣100元錢，不管是掙來的，還是贏來的，或者揀來的，對消費(fèi)者來說都是一樣的。但是許多研究表明并非如此。芝加哥大學(xué)商學(xué)院的Thaler教授根據(jù)錢的不完全可替代性提出了 Mental Accounting的概念。

考慮下面的情形：今天晚上你打算去聽一場音樂會(huì)。票價(jià)是200塊錢。在你馬上要出發(fā)的時(shí)候，你發(fā)現(xiàn)你把你最近買的價(jià)值200塊錢的電話卡弄丟了。你是否還會(huì)去聽這場音樂會(huì)？大部分的回答者仍舊會(huì)去聽音樂會(huì)。但是如果情況變化一下，假設(shè)昨天你花了200塊錢買了一張今天晚上的音樂會(huì)票子。在你馬上要出發(fā)的時(shí)候，你發(fā)現(xiàn)你把票子弄丟了。如果你想要聽這場音樂會(huì)，你必須再花200塊錢買張票。你是否還是會(huì)去聽這場音樂會(huì)？大部分人回答說不去了。仔細(xì)想想，這兩個(gè)回答是自相矛盾的。不管消費(fèi)者丟掉的是電話卡還是音樂會(huì)票，總之是丟失了價(jià)值200元的東西從fungibility的角度來講沒有理由丟失了電話卡后仍舊去聽音樂會(huì)，而丟失了票子后就不去聽了。原因到底何在呢？事實(shí)上，在人們的頭腦里，錢并不像傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)所假設(shè)的那樣，具有完全可替代性。真正的情況是，人們會(huì)把不同的東西歸在不同的Mental Accounts里面。電話卡和音樂會(huì)票分別在兩個(gè)賬戶里面，所以丟失了電話卡不會(huì)影響音樂會(huì)票子所在賬戶的預(yù)算和支出，大部分人仍舊選擇去聽音樂會(huì)。但是丟了的音樂會(huì)票和后來需要再買的票子都被歸在一個(gè)賬戶里，所以看起來就好像花了400元錢聽一場音樂會(huì)一樣。人們當(dāng)然覺得這不合算 所以就不去了。

比方說，如果你是一個(gè)理性的人，那么對你來說，不管是掙來的錢還是一筆意外之財(cái)，對你來說應(yīng)該沒有什么區(qū)別。但時(shí)，一般來說，你會(huì)把自己辛辛苦苦掙來的錢存起來不舍得花，但是如果是一筆意外之財(cái)，你就很快地花掉了。這其實(shí)說明人們在頭腦里分別為這兩類錢建立了兩個(gè)不同的賬戶，掙來的錢和意外之財(cái)是不一樣的。另外，這個(gè)概念還可以幫助政府制訂政策。比方說，一個(gè)政府如果想通過減少稅收的方式刺激消費(fèi)，可以有兩個(gè)做法，一個(gè)是減稅，即降低稅收水平，另外一個(gè)是退稅，就是一段時(shí)間以后返還納稅人一部分稅金。這兩個(gè)做法從fungibility的角度來講沒有差別，減收5％和返還5％的稅是一樣的。但是減稅和退稅在刺激消費(fèi)上的作用卻非常不同。人們覺得減收的那部分稅金是自己本來該得的，自己掙來的，所以增加消費(fèi)的動(dòng)力并不大；但是返還的稅金對人們來說就如同一筆意外之財(cái)，這時(shí)人們才有可能增加更多的消費(fèi)。如果一個(gè)政府不明白這個(gè)道理，很有可能減少了財(cái)政收入，卻起不到刺激消費(fèi)的作用。

規(guī)范性理論和描述性理論的區(qū)別

第二部分主要介紹新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)很重要的一個(gè)內(nèi)容——風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決策理論的修正。

傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是一個(gè)規(guī)范性的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，也就是教育人們應(yīng)該怎樣做。而在心理學(xué)影響下的新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是一個(gè)描述性的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，它主要描述人們事實(shí)上是怎樣做的。這就好像一個(gè)人在高速公路上開車，交通法規(guī)規(guī)定限速80公里，這是規(guī)范性的；而事實(shí)上人們在車輛稀少的時(shí)候會(huì)開到100公里，這就是一個(gè)描述性的。比方說，宗教就是規(guī)范性的，而物理學(xué)則是描述性的。從這個(gè)意義上講，傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)更像是家教，而新的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)更像是科學(xué)。

最早的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決策理論叫做期望值理論。這個(gè)理論提出，人們是根據(jù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決策的期望值大小來進(jìn)行選擇的。比方說有兩個(gè)選擇，A是有30％的可能性贏2000元，B是有70％的可能性贏1000元。這兩個(gè)選擇的期望值分別是600和700。那么期望值理論認(rèn)為人們會(huì)選擇B。這個(gè)理論認(rèn)為人們都是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中立的，即人們只考慮一個(gè)選擇的期望值，而不考慮它的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)大小，這是這個(gè)理論的一個(gè)很重要的假設(shè)。

但是人是否是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中立的呢？請你思考以下這樣兩個(gè)選擇，A是有100％的可能性贏1000元，B是有50％的可能性贏2100元，有50％的可能性一分錢也拿不到。從期望值來說，B大于A。但是如果要你來選擇，你會(huì)選擇哪一個(gè)呢？大部分的人會(huì)選擇A。200多年前，貝努力為了解釋這一現(xiàn)象，提出了期望效用理論。這個(gè)理論指出，財(cái)富的邊際效用是遞減的，50％可能性贏2100元的效用小于 100％贏1000元的效用。這個(gè)理論是一個(gè)規(guī)范性的理論，它是微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)一個(gè)重要的奠基石。這個(gè)理論假定人們都是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的，因此人們選擇100％贏1000元是完全理性的。這個(gè)理論是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的一大進(jìn)展，也有許多政策應(yīng)用。在美國，特別是民主黨，非常推崇財(cái)富再分配的政策，也就是向富人多征稅再分配給窮人，其理論依據(jù)就是邊際效用遞減。對富人來說增加1美元的效用要小于給窮人增加1美元帶來的效用，所以應(yīng)該把這1美元給窮人。

但是，問題在于，人們是不是任何時(shí)候都是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的呢？看看下面這個(gè)問題：假定有這樣兩個(gè)選擇，A是肯定贏1000元，B是50％可能性贏2000元，50％可能性什么都得不到。你會(huì)選擇哪一個(gè)呢？大部分人都會(huì)選擇A，這也說明人是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的。但是再看下面的問題。假定你剛剛贏了2000元。你面臨兩個(gè)選擇，A是你肯定損失1000元，B是你有50％可能性損失2000元，50%可能性什么都不損失。在這種情況下 你會(huì)選擇什么呢？大部分人都選擇B，這表明他們是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛的�？墒牵�仔細(xì)分析一下這兩個(gè)問題，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它們是完全等價(jià)的�？隙ㄚA1000元等于從贏來的2000元中肯定損失1000元；50％贏2000元也就是先贏2000元的情況下有50％可能性不損失錢50％；什么也拿不到就相當(dāng)于先贏2000元的情況下有50％的可能性損失2000元。但是人們?yōu)槭裁丛诘谝环N情況下風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避，在第二種情況下就變成了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛呢？

Prospect Theory能夠很好地解釋上面的情況。這個(gè)理論是Kahneman和Tverskey在1979年提出的，也是Kahneman今年獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)的主要原因。Prospect Theory認(rèn)為，人在面臨獲得的時(shí)候是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的，而在面臨損失的時(shí)候是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)趨向的。在上面的例子中，第一種情況下，贏錢對人們來說是一種獲得，所以人們選擇規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是在第二種情況下，人們面臨的是損失，因此人們傾向于冒風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，也就是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏愛的。但是，獲得和損失并不是絕對的，而是相對于參照點(diǎn)而言的。一般來說，參照點(diǎn)是人們對一件事情的期望。比方說你高考的時(shí)候考了600分，對你來說到底是獲得還損失呢？這要看你對自己的期望。你希望自己能考550分，那么相對于550這個(gè)參照點(diǎn)來說你考600分是獲得。假如你希望能考650分，但是你只有600分，那么相對于650來說考600分就是損失。

根據(jù)Prospect Theory上面這三點(diǎn)理論，我們可以得到一個(gè)非常有意思的推論。就是說，如果改變?nèi)藗冊谠u價(jià)事物時(shí)候所使用的參照點(diǎn)，可以改變?nèi)藗兊娘L(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好�？聪旅嬉粋�(gè)例子。假定一家公司面臨兩個(gè)投資決策，投資方案A肯定可以盈利200萬。投資方案B有5O％可能性盈利300完，50%可能盈利100萬。如果公司的盈利目標(biāo)定得比較低，比方說是100萬，那么方案A看起來好像是多賺了100萬，而B則是要么剛好達(dá)到目標(biāo)，要么多盈利200萬。A和B看起來都是獲得，因此員工一般是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的，會(huì)選擇方案A。但是如果公司把盈利目標(biāo)提高到300萬，那么方案A就像是少賺了100萬，而B則是要么剛好達(dá)到目標(biāo)，要么少賺200萬。這個(gè)時(shí)候兩個(gè)方案都是損失，所以員工會(huì)抱著冒冒風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，說不定可以達(dá)到目標(biāo)的心理，選擇有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的投資方案B。由此可見，一個(gè)企業(yè)如果要影響其員工對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的偏好，可以通過改變企業(yè)對業(yè)績的期望水平的做法達(dá)到目的。

Prospect Theory還有一個(gè)非常重要的貢獻(xiàn)，就是發(fā)現(xiàn)了人們對損失和獲得的敏感程度是不同的，人們對損失比對獲得更敏感。如果你的新鄰居送給你100元的小禮品以示友好，你想想看你有多高興。但是如果他剛來就弄壞了你的一個(gè)100元的落地?zé)�，你對他有多討厭呢？你對他討厭的程度�?yīng)該比前面喜歡他的程度要大得多。Thaler曾經(jīng)做過這樣一個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)。假設(shè)你得了一種病，有萬分之一的可能性會(huì)突然死亡。有一種藥吃了以后可以把死亡的可能性降到零。那么你愿意花多少錢來買這種藥呢？那么現(xiàn)在再請你想一想，假定你身體很健康，如果說醫(yī)藥公司想找一些人測試他們新研制的一種藥品，這種藥服用后會(huì)使你有萬分之一的幾率突然死亡。那么你會(huì)要求醫(yī)藥公司做多少補(bǔ)償呢？很多人回答說愿意出幾百塊錢來買藥，但是即使醫(yī)藥公司花幾萬塊，他們也不愿意參加實(shí)驗(yàn)。為什么第一種情況人們不愿意花錢治病，但是第二種精況，醫(yī)藥公司花幾萬塊錢人們都不愿意參加實(shí)驗(yàn)?zāi)�？�?shí)際上就是損失規(guī)避這個(gè)心理在作怪。在第一種情況下，病已經(jīng)得了，治好病是一種獲得，由于人們對獲得相對不敏感，所以不愿意用很多錢來換取。在第二種情況下，本身身體健康，增加死亡的概率對人們來說是一個(gè)難以接受的損失，所以人們對損失所要求的補(bǔ)償就遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于他們愿意為治病所支付的錢。

從損失規(guī)避這個(gè)概念出發(fā)，有許多問題值得我們重新思考。比方說我們前面提到過，根據(jù)期望效用理論，財(cái)富再分配是一個(gè)很好的提高總效用的政策。但是如果考慮到人們討厭損失的話，一邊是從一個(gè)人的工資里面扣除1000元，這個(gè)損失在人們的心中占了很大分量，另一方面，另外一個(gè)人收入增加1000元，后者的高興程度不一定高于損失給前者帶來的不快。在市場營銷中損失規(guī)避這個(gè)概念也有非常廣泛的應(yīng)用。在美國購物，比方說100塊的CD機(jī)，如果商店規(guī)定，支付現(xiàn)金，則按商品的原價(jià)計(jì)算，如果以信用卡支付，則需要支付105塊。人們通常覺得沒有必要承擔(dān)這5塊錢的損失，所以更愿意以現(xiàn)金支付。但是如果這個(gè)CD機(jī)本來的價(jià)格就是105元，顧客以現(xiàn)金支付可以優(yōu)惠到100元，而用信用卡的話則以原價(jià)計(jì)算，這個(gè)時(shí)候人們就不會(huì)覺得用信用卡支付會(huì)有損失，這種定價(jià)方式可以刺激信用卡消費(fèi)。而實(shí)際上在這兩種定價(jià)方式下商品的價(jià)格是一樣的。只不過改變了人們的參照點(diǎn)，從而改變了一個(gè)事物看起來是不是損失，就可以很容易地改變?nèi)藗兊闹Ц斗绞健?

財(cái)富和廣義的幸福

在講最后一部分之前，請大家思考這樣一個(gè)問題：想不想換一個(gè)工資更高的工作？當(dāng)然想。

但是有了更多的工資是為了什么呢？為了生活更富裕。那么生活更富裕是為了什么呢？歸根到底，人們最終在追求的是生話的幸福，而不是有更多的金錢。我們的最終目的不是最大化財(cái)富，而是最大化人們的幸福。但是傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為增加人們的財(cái)富是提高人們幸福水平的最有效的手段。但是我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，財(cái)富僅僅是能夠帶來幸福的根小的因素之一，事實(shí)上幸福是由許多其他因素決定的。傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家關(guān)注的是如何最大化財(cái)富，但新經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)認(rèn)為我們應(yīng)該關(guān)心如何提高人們的幸福本身。

美國在過去的幾十年中人均GDP翻了幾番，但是許多研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，不管用什么指標(biāo)什么方法測量，人們的幸福程度并沒有多大的變化，壓力反而增加了。這就產(chǎn)生了一個(gè)非常有趣的問題：我們耗費(fèi)了那么多的精力和資源，增加了整個(gè)社會(huì)的財(cái)富，但是人們的幸福程度卻沒有什么變化。這究竟是為什么呢？

其實(shí)，人們到底是不是幸福，很大程度上取決于許多和絕對財(cái)富無關(guān)的因素。比如，有兩類比較可以十人們帶來幸福感。一種是時(shí)間性的比較，一種是社會(huì)性的比較。如果你最近在上海的市中心買了一套別墅，你覺得很開心。但實(shí)際上你你覺得開心只有很少一部分是因?yàn)槟銈冊谶@樣的房子里給你帶來的，更多的是因?yàn)楸容^而產(chǎn)生的。從時(shí)間性比較來說，如果你以前住在閣樓里，那么現(xiàn)在你住別墅會(huì)感到非常幸福。如果你以前住的是花園洋房，那么你不會(huì)感到特別開心。這就是時(shí)間性的比較的結(jié)果。另外，從社會(huì)性比較來說，如果你和你周圍的人，你的朋友同事進(jìn)行比較時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)，其他人都還住普普通通的公房，而你現(xiàn)在有自己的別墅，你當(dāng)然會(huì)很開心。如果說你周圍的人現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)都住在更好的地方了，那么你就算住在別墅里感覺舒服，你也不會(huì)非常開心。

幸福的另外一個(gè)來源是脈沖式式的變化所帶來的（見圖 2）。如果一個(gè)人一直過著優(yōu)越的生活而沒有什么變化，他是不會(huì)比一般人幸福的。也就是說，舒適并不是幸福的重要因素。但是如果一個(gè)人本身生活水平不是特別高，但是他時(shí)不時(shí)地會(huì)有一些變化，比如旅游、探險(xiǎn)等這些脈沖式的快樂，則能使人感覺到更加本福。

此外，記憶也是幸福的一個(gè)來源。給員工獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)可以發(fā)現(xiàn)金，也可以給其他的東西�，F(xiàn)在許多公司發(fā)放獎(jiǎng)金都是直接發(fā)錢給員工。公司也可以用同樣金額的錢，讓員工享受一下他們平常舍不得享受的事物，比方說到高級法國餐廳吃飯，到夏威夷旅游等。從傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)來看，哪個(gè)更好呢？肯定是前面一種好。如果把這兩種方法給員工選擇的話，人們也會(huì)選擇前面一種。但是，有實(shí)驗(yàn)表明人們反而對后面一種獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)更開心。這是因?yàn)樵诰筒突蚵糜谓Y(jié)束后，人們還是會(huì)記得這段經(jīng)歷，這段美好的記憶也可以讓人們感到更為幸福，獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)的效果也更好。

更多的金錢并不一定帶來更多的幸福。人們選的并不總是能使他們最高興的。我們需要有一個(gè)嚴(yán)格的理論來研究如何最大化人們的幸福。和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)Economics相對應(yīng)，我們把這種科學(xué)稱為Hedonomics。這就是新的研究方向。我希望在不久的將來，每天晚上人們從電視上看到的不僅僅是道瓊斯指數(shù)，恒生指數(shù)等，還包括跟人們生活密切相關(guān)的幸福指數(shù)等等。

此外，在總統(tǒng)致辭的時(shí)候，人民代表大會(huì)上國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人總結(jié)過去的時(shí)候，不僅僅是以GDP和投資的增加來說明自己取得的業(yè)績，而是更多的提到人們“幸福指數(shù)”的變化。

關(guān)于2003年上半年水運(yùn)經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行情況及下半年形勢分析的通報(bào)

各省、自治區(qū)、直轄市交通廳（委），上海市港口管理局，長江、珠江航務(wù)管理局，中國船東、港口、船代協(xié)會(huì)，各有關(guān)港航企業(yè)：

2003年我國國民經(jīng)濟(jì)開局良好，一季度國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值增幅為9.9%，二季度增長6.7%，上半年國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值整體增長8.2%，工農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)持續(xù)發(fā)展。固定資產(chǎn)投資、進(jìn)出口貿(mào)易和利用外資快速增長，社會(huì)消費(fèi)穩(wěn)定增加。受“非典”疫情影響，二季度經(jīng)濟(jì)增速減緩，固定資產(chǎn)投資和進(jìn)出口受“非典”影響較小，消費(fèi)增長的潛力還在，增勢依然強(qiáng)勁。下半年，我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展形勢依然良好，預(yù)計(jì)全年經(jīng)濟(jì)增幅將在7%以上，外貿(mào)進(jìn)出口可保持兩位數(shù)的增長。

一、上半年水運(yùn)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢及水運(yùn)生產(chǎn)主要特點(diǎn)

今年以來，在我國國民經(jīng)濟(jì)較快增長的帶動(dòng)下，我國水上運(yùn)輸繼續(xù)保持了良好的發(fā)展勢頭。水上貨運(yùn)量、港口貨物吞吐量繼續(xù)快速增長；國內(nèi)沿海運(yùn)輸市場運(yùn)力偏緊，運(yùn)價(jià)逐步攀升；港口裝卸任務(wù)繁忙，裝卸效率大大提高。

1~6月份，全國水路貨運(yùn)量完成7.02億噸，同比增長6.1%，周轉(zhuǎn)量14100.98億噸公里，同比增長12.4%；客運(yùn)量完成7928萬人，同比下降12.8%。全國主要港口貨物吞吐量完成12.36億噸，同比增長17.3%，其中外貿(mào)完成4.5億噸，同比增長23.8%。

（一）上半年水路運(yùn)輸生產(chǎn)主要特點(diǎn)

1、主要港口貨物吞吐量仍然保持較高增長速度

今年上半年港口生產(chǎn)形勢依然向好，沿海、內(nèi)河港口內(nèi)外貿(mào)貨物吞吐量增勢迅猛。沿海主要港口吞吐量完成9.40億噸，同比增長19.0%，其中外貿(mào)完成4.17億噸，同比增長24.6%；內(nèi)河主要港口完成2.96億噸，同比增長12.3%，其中外貿(mào)完成0.33億噸，同比增長14.6%。全國主要港口集裝箱吞吐量完成2167.46萬標(biāo)準(zhǔn)箱，同比增長32.4%。

盡管上半年“非典”疫情對沿海運(yùn)輸帶來一定影響，但各個(gè)港口采取各種有效防范措施，確保了港口生產(chǎn)和建設(shè)的正常運(yùn)行；港口貨物吞吐量除內(nèi)河完成量增幅略低于去年外，其余均高于去年同期。各港口在船舶、船員檢疫方面增加了一些程序，增加了運(yùn)輸企業(yè)的船舶在港時(shí)間和運(yùn)輸成本，但是，由于上半年外貿(mào)運(yùn)輸和國內(nèi)沿海運(yùn)輸需求強(qiáng)勁，市場上運(yùn)力供應(yīng)偏緊，運(yùn)價(jià)穩(wěn)中有升，企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)效益有明顯好轉(zhuǎn)。

2、貨運(yùn)量增速減緩，客運(yùn)量大幅度減少

與去年相比，今年上半年沿海運(yùn)輸繼續(xù)保持增長態(tài)勢，內(nèi)河運(yùn)輸貨量減少，遠(yuǎn)洋運(yùn)輸形勢喜人。今年1~6月份沿海貨運(yùn)量1.95億噸，同比增長14.2%，內(nèi)河完成3.5億噸，同比下跌0.1%，遠(yuǎn)洋完成1.6億噸，同比增長14.5%。內(nèi)河運(yùn)量減少的主要原因一是受三峽斷航蓄水期的影響，二是國內(nèi)“非典”事件對運(yùn)輸?shù)闹苯佑绊憽?

受“非典”疫情的直接影響，旅游、公務(wù)出差人員大幅減少，國內(nèi)、國外旅游團(tuán)隊(duì)紛紛退團(tuán)，大部分航線被迫停開。全社會(huì)水路客運(yùn)量，內(nèi)河完成4990萬人，同比下降27.4%；沿海完成2762萬人，同比下降19.4%；遠(yuǎn)洋完成176萬人，同比下降33.3%。

3、內(nèi)河貨物運(yùn)輸與去年同期基本持平，略有增長

受三峽工程礙斷航影響，長江上、中游地區(qū)貨物吞吐量下降，九江（含九江）以上14個(gè)主要港口僅4個(gè)港口吞吐量超上年同期水平，而九江以下港口則全面超上年同期水平。其中江蘇省區(qū)段中鎮(zhèn)江、泰州、江陰、張家港和南通等5個(gè)港口都超過去年同期水平，是長江干線上增幅較大的地區(qū)。增長的貨類主要有：鋼鐵、礦建材料、金屬礦石、水泥、木材和糧食等。下降的貨類主要有：石油天然氣及制品、機(jī)械設(shè)備電器等�；�本持平的貨類主要有煤炭及制品、輕工醫(yī)藥等。

（二）上半年散貨運(yùn)輸主要貨種情況分析

1、煤炭運(yùn)輸

上半年，煤炭海上運(yùn)力偏緊，運(yùn)價(jià)高位運(yùn)行。按照慣例煤炭市場在4、5月份進(jìn)入淡季，海上運(yùn)輸船舶進(jìn)入常規(guī)的維護(hù)檢修和保養(yǎng)，而今年華南部分地區(qū)用電高峰提前到來，電煤旺盛的需求形勢出人預(yù)料，再加上年初石油價(jià)格漲幅較大，增加了海上運(yùn)輸成本，運(yùn)營船舶減少，由此造成運(yùn)力供應(yīng)不足。

1-6月上海航運(yùn)交易所發(fā)布的沿海煤炭運(yùn)價(jià)指數(shù)總體呈上揚(yáng)態(tài)勢，到6月27日創(chuàng)下上半年最高記錄，報(bào)收于1173.87點(diǎn)，比去年同期上漲3.07%。與往年相比，不同的是今年運(yùn)價(jià)指數(shù)在3月底就出現(xiàn)上升跡象，穩(wěn)步攀升。其中五月上旬受“非典”影響，船舶運(yùn)力稍有緩解，運(yùn)價(jià)有所回落。

（1）煤炭進(jìn)口增長有限，出口增幅提高

與去年相比，今年國際市場上煤炭運(yùn)價(jià)提高，煤炭進(jìn)口勢頭有所抑制。另外，我國煤炭出口優(yōu)惠政策延長到2005年。今年1-6月我國煤炭出口形勢良好，共出口4497.2萬噸，同比增長10.6%。

（2）沿海煤炭運(yùn)輸需求旺盛，煤炭水運(yùn)貨源充足

今年以來，國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速增長帶動(dòng)了煤炭需求的增長。1-6月份全國發(fā)電量較去年同期增長15.4%，其中火力發(fā)電較去年同期增長16%。另受三峽大壩蓄水影響，長江斷航2個(gè)多月，葛洲壩水電站減少水力2/3，使中南、華東地區(qū)火力發(fā)電大幅增長，煤炭消費(fèi)大量增加。煤炭需求的增長為水運(yùn)提供了充足的貨源保障。我國沿海主要港口煤炭總發(fā)運(yùn)量增加。

（3）長江四港煤炭運(yùn)輸情況良好

上半年，“三口一枝”共發(fā)運(yùn)煤炭867.88萬噸，比去年同期增長16.5%。其中浦口、裕溪口、漢口和枝城港分別發(fā)運(yùn)煤炭318.74萬噸、350.11萬噸、157.7萬噸和41.33萬噸，分別為上年同期的108.77%、120.1%、97.43%和118.89%。

2、鐵礦石運(yùn)輸

今年1-6月份，鐵礦石運(yùn)輸市場發(fā)展平穩(wěn)。盡管今年進(jìn)口鐵礦石價(jià)格呈逐月上漲態(tài)勢，但進(jìn)口礦石量依然較大，運(yùn)輸需求比較旺盛，運(yùn)力供求稍顯緊張。

由于船公司和鋼廠基本上簽訂年度運(yùn)輸合同，運(yùn)價(jià)年內(nèi)變化不大，運(yùn)價(jià)指數(shù)在1000點(diǎn)左右徘徊，目前較年初略高一些。1-6月份沿海鐵礦石運(yùn)價(jià)指數(shù)整體走勢上行，在3月初有明顯漲幅，主要原因中轉(zhuǎn)鐵礦量大幅增加所致。

（1）主要港口鐵礦石接卸量繼續(xù)保持增長

隨著鐵礦石的大量進(jìn)口，今年上半年，我國沿海進(jìn)口鐵礦石各主要接卸港礦石接卸量為7191萬噸，較去年同期增長31%。青島、秦皇島、天津、湛江等四港今年上半年進(jìn)口鐵礦石接卸量的增幅在30%以上。長江干線主要港口金屬礦石吞吐量完成2391.9萬噸，比去年同期增長10.5%。

（2）二、三程鐵礦石運(yùn)輸量上升

由于沿江的一些鋼廠設(shè)備改制后，鋼鐵產(chǎn)量增加，并且對礦石的品質(zhì)要求提高，對進(jìn)口礦石需求增加，由此帶動(dòng)了二、三程鐵礦石運(yùn)輸量不斷攀升。

（3）鐵礦石接卸趨于集中

隨著到港船舶大型化趨勢明顯加快，鐵礦石的接卸越來越趨向國內(nèi)大港。1-6月份青島港、寧波港、上海港、天津港、舟山等五大港口共進(jìn)口鐵礦石5120萬噸，占全國水路進(jìn)口量的71.2%。青島港自20 萬噸鐵礦石碼頭正式投產(chǎn)后，進(jìn)口礦石的接卸和中轉(zhuǎn)能力快速提升，上半年累計(jì)達(dá)1702萬噸，同比增長40% 。寧波港在舟山馬跡山港每月分流了近百萬噸情況下，同比仍增長了10%，累計(jì)達(dá)到1262萬噸。

3、石油及其制品運(yùn)輸

（1）原油運(yùn)輸

①外貿(mào)進(jìn)出口原油運(yùn)輸量同步增長

據(jù)海關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì)，我國1-6月份原油進(jìn)口4380萬噸，比去年同期增長32.88%；

原油進(jìn)口量增加明顯是我國原油加工量受到成品油市場強(qiáng)勁推動(dòng)而高居，出現(xiàn)了不同以往的“淡季不淡”的現(xiàn)象。

②三程中轉(zhuǎn)油運(yùn)輸量增長空間有限，二程運(yùn)輸也受影響

受魯寧管道運(yùn)輸?shù)挠绊懀�以及中石化將繼續(xù)實(shí)行向效益相對較好的沿海石化企業(yè)傾斜的政策，對沿江煉廠繼續(xù)實(shí)行限產(chǎn)保量，三程運(yùn)輸貨源有限，海進(jìn)江運(yùn)輸也受此連累。

（2）成品油運(yùn)輸同比增長

隨著我國加入WTO，國內(nèi)成品油市場逐步開放，成品油進(jìn)口呈現(xiàn)大幅增長態(tài)勢。同時(shí)，出口量有所增長，原因是由于“非典”事件，國內(nèi)需求減少，為了平衡國內(nèi)產(chǎn)量供應(yīng)，兩大集團(tuán)調(diào)整增加出口汽、柴油量。

（三）上半年集裝箱運(yùn)輸形勢分析

2003年上半年，伴隨世界經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易穩(wěn)步復(fù)蘇之勢，世界集裝箱運(yùn)輸市場增勢強(qiáng)勁，主要呈現(xiàn)以下特點(diǎn)：

1、運(yùn)力增長明顯放緩。至2003年5月1日，世界全集裝箱船隊(duì)規(guī)模達(dá)3099艘，617萬TEU，箱位僅較2002年底新增3.4%，明顯低于去年同期增幅，今年上半年船舶訂造勢頭有增無減，新增2004年至2005年交船的訂造量58.9萬TEU。

2、運(yùn)輸需求保持旺盛。上半年，亞歐和跨太平洋兩大主干線需求保持強(qiáng)勁增長，以中國為主要增長點(diǎn)的亞洲出口獨(dú)領(lǐng)風(fēng)騷。第一季度，亞歐西行運(yùn)量較上年同期增長了23%，亞洲至北美西海岸運(yùn)量也同比增長15%。第二季度，隨著貨運(yùn)旺季的到來，運(yùn)輸需求更加趨于旺盛�？傮w上看，上半年運(yùn)輸需求增長略高于運(yùn)力增長，在一定程度上緩解了供需矛盾，需求與供給呈現(xiàn)出基本平衡的狀態(tài)。

3、班輪運(yùn)價(jià)穩(wěn)步攀升，租金價(jià)格持續(xù)走高。由于市場供求的良性發(fā)展，班輪運(yùn)價(jià)呈穩(wěn)步攀升之勢。年初，遠(yuǎn)東班輪公會(huì)等各大公會(huì)或協(xié)議組織紛紛公布了航線運(yùn)價(jià)上調(diào)計(jì)劃，運(yùn)費(fèi)水平穩(wěn)步上升。船舶租金價(jià)格也逐月走高，2000TEU型以上的大型船舶倍受青睞。各船型的租金價(jià)格基本恢復(fù)到2000年市場鼎盛時(shí)期的平均水平。

4、我國外貿(mào)集裝箱運(yùn)輸形勢良好。今年上半年我國外貿(mào)進(jìn)出口總值達(dá)3761.4億美元，比去年同期增長39％。其中出口1903.2億美元，增長34％，進(jìn)口1858.2億美元，增長44.5％，累計(jì)實(shí)現(xiàn)貿(mào)易順差45億美元。對主要地區(qū)進(jìn)出口而言，日中雙邊貿(mào)易總額達(dá)609.1億美元，增長36.1％，仍排在第一位。美國仍為我國第二大貿(mào)易伙伴和第一大出口市場，總額564億美元，增長34.4％。歐盟第三，貿(mào)易總額達(dá)到了555.1億美元，增長44.2％。我國與其他主要貿(mào)易伙伴雙邊貿(mào)易增長速度也均超過了20％，其中與東盟和韓國的雙邊貿(mào)易增長速度超過40％。我國進(jìn)出口貿(mào)易的強(qiáng)勁上升促進(jìn)了外貿(mào)運(yùn)輸市場欣欣向榮。

5、港口吞吐量增長迅猛，運(yùn)輸需求持續(xù)旺盛。今年上半年，港口吞吐量繼續(xù)呈高增長態(tài)勢，全國主要港口累計(jì)完成集裝箱吞吐量2167.5萬TEU，較上年同期增長32.4%，其中，沿海港口完成吞吐量2031.8萬TEU，較上年同期增長33.1%，內(nèi)河港口完成吞吐量135.7萬TEU，較上年同期增長21.9%。遠(yuǎn)洋航線第一季度淡季不淡，平均艙位利用率居高不下，近洋航線運(yùn)量較去年同期也有明顯的增長。

6、非典對班輪運(yùn)輸?shù)呢?fù)面影響不明顯。班輪運(yùn)輸船舶的貨物在港與其他運(yùn)輸船舶一樣，需經(jīng)過嚴(yán)格的檢查程序，非生產(chǎn)性停時(shí)和運(yùn)輸成本有所增加，但是對貨物運(yùn)量沒有較大影響。從我國經(jīng)濟(jì)內(nèi)在活力來看，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長處于中期性強(qiáng)勢狀態(tài)，非典對其沖擊估計(jì)是短時(shí)的、局部性的，不會(huì)影響長期增長趨勢。

7、國內(nèi)及內(nèi)支線集裝箱運(yùn)量保持增長。1~6月份，上海港完成內(nèi)支線吞吐量41.1萬TEU，同比增長27.1%；南京港完成內(nèi)支線吞吐量9.2萬TEU，同比增長30%；青島港完成內(nèi)支線吞吐量7.46萬TEU，增幅最為顯著，達(dá)117.9%。長江、沿海和環(huán)渤海灣三大內(nèi)支線運(yùn)輸發(fā)展速度較快。但據(jù)企業(yè)反映，由于市場的激烈競爭和航道水深限制等，船公司經(jīng)營無法實(shí)現(xiàn)規(guī)模效應(yīng)，運(yùn)價(jià)一路走低，盈利水平令人堪憂。

內(nèi)貿(mào)集裝箱運(yùn)輸市場在國內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)的支撐下，也表現(xiàn)出高增長特征，主要港口內(nèi)貿(mào)集裝箱吞吐量同比增長明顯，主要航運(yùn)公司的運(yùn)量大幅上升。前6個(gè)月，中海集團(tuán)累計(jì)完成內(nèi)貿(mào)集裝箱運(yùn)量55.8萬TEU，同比增長20.1%；中遠(yuǎn)集團(tuán)完成內(nèi)貿(mào)集裝箱運(yùn)量17萬TEU，同比增長54.5%。非典對內(nèi)貿(mào)運(yùn)輸?shù)挠绊懼饕�表現(xiàn)在貨源結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整上，4、5月份瓷磚等建材運(yùn)輸需求略有減少，而新鮮果蔬的需求明顯增多。

（四）上半年水運(yùn)基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)

為滿足我國內(nèi)外貿(mào)航運(yùn)運(yùn)輸需求的快速發(fā)展，全國主要港口加快航道、港口等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)，2003年將新增深水泊位17個(gè)，新增港口吞吐能力3400萬噸。但總體上，我國目前大型專業(yè)化深水碼頭短缺，集裝箱碼頭吞吐能力不足，沿海主要港口航道不能適應(yīng)船舶大型化的要求。我國今后將重點(diǎn)加強(qiáng)大型專業(yè)化港口的建設(shè)，使沿海港口向?qū)�業(yè)化、大型化、集約化運(yùn)輸方向發(fā)展。

今年，我國沿海港口建設(shè)項(xiàng)目較多。其中：大連港大窯灣二期工程、大窯灣25萬噸級礦石碼頭工程、30萬噸原油碼頭、6 X 10萬立方米原油儲(chǔ)罐、新港區(qū)油碼頭改擴(kuò)建，全部按計(jì)劃開工建設(shè)，工程進(jìn)展情況正常；營口港成品油及液體化工品碼頭工程、三期工程多用途泊位、52#53#集裝箱泊位、糧食中轉(zhuǎn)設(shè)施，二港池順岸工程，全部按照年初計(jì)劃順利建設(shè)，51#集裝箱泊位在今年10月試生產(chǎn)；河北神華黃驊港一期工程同步建成3.5萬噸級泊位一個(gè)，5萬噸級泊位兩個(gè)。二期煤碼頭共3個(gè)泊位，其中10萬噸級泊位1個(gè)、5萬噸級泊位兩個(gè)，另合資興建兩萬噸級液體化學(xué)品碼頭和罐區(qū)；天津港南疆20萬噸級通用散貨泊位主體工程今年年底竣工；青島港開工建設(shè)中國最大的液體化工碼頭。

長江基本建設(shè)迎來了歷史上少有的建設(shè)發(fā)展時(shí)期，上游的蘭敘段、三峽庫區(qū)淹沒復(fù)建工程，中游的界牌水道應(yīng)急加固工程、碾子灣淺水道整治、張南水道整治主體工程和下游的南京至瀏河口航路改革配套航標(biāo)建設(shè)等工程已全面開工建設(shè)。

二、存在的主要問題

總的來說，沿海、內(nèi)河航運(yùn)發(fā)展總體形勢較好，但仍存在著一些不容忽視的問題。

（一）沿海港口通過能力不足。吞吐能力不足與貨物通過量急劇上升的矛盾仍然存在。目前，在我國沿海港口中深水泊位僅占10%卻承擔(dān)了 90%的貨物吞吐量。隨著港口集裝箱吞吐量的迅猛增長，各大港口生產(chǎn)泊位偏緊，港口吞吐能力不足的矛盾日益突出。

（二） 運(yùn)力結(jié)構(gòu)還不太合理。從今年的水運(yùn)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢看，國際干線集裝箱運(yùn)力已顯不足；近洋集裝箱航線運(yùn)力有些過剩；沿海運(yùn)輸中小噸位的船舶偏多，大噸位船舶略顯緊張。

（三）長江三峽雙線五級船閘實(shí)際通過能力影響船舶營運(yùn)效率。從試通航以來的實(shí)際運(yùn)行情況看，船閘實(shí)際運(yùn)行閘次與理論設(shè)計(jì)閘次存在較大差距，船舶積壓排隊(duì)候閘狀況比較嚴(yán)重，對船舶運(yùn)行效率和航運(yùn)成本影響很大。長江上船型雜亂，也是影響提高長江通過能力和航行安全的主要因素之一。

（四）國際集裝箱運(yùn)輸?shù)臐撛诶щy與問題。美伊戰(zhàn)爭導(dǎo)致油價(jià)上漲，國際燃油價(jià)格急劇攀升，增加了運(yùn)輸企業(yè)生產(chǎn)成本和經(jīng)濟(jì)負(fù)擔(dān)。美國裝船前24小時(shí)艙單申報(bào)制度，使得我國港口到美國的航線的貨物運(yùn)輸作業(yè)復(fù)雜，延長了備貨期，運(yùn)輸和貿(mào)易成本相應(yīng)增加。日本航線運(yùn)價(jià)競爭日益加劇，年初運(yùn)價(jià)不及2001年的50%，個(gè)別航線4月份將運(yùn)價(jià)拼殺到“零” ，6月份甚至出現(xiàn)負(fù)運(yùn)價(jià)，月平均艙位利用率最高的僅為77%，最低不到60%。運(yùn)價(jià)的頻繁波動(dòng)和下跌，使得船公司近洋航線的經(jīng)營處于動(dòng)蕩局面。

三、下半年水運(yùn)經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢展望

隨著國家宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的改善，一系列政策的出臺將會(huì)逐步消除“非典”疫情所帶來的負(fù)面影響。國家將進(jìn)一步加快船隊(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整步伐，改善沿海運(yùn)力結(jié)構(gòu)狀況；內(nèi)河船型標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化工作加快推進(jìn)；港口、航道等基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)不斷加強(qiáng)，國際近洋航線市場監(jiān)管加強(qiáng)，市場競爭狀況會(huì)有所改善。國內(nèi)水路貨物運(yùn)輸將繼續(xù)保持快速增長態(tài)勢。

歷經(jīng)多年的《港口法》的出臺，將會(huì)大大加快港口體制改革的步伐，推進(jìn)水運(yùn)法律法規(guī)體系不斷健全，市場機(jī)制進(jìn)一步完善，市場整頓力度加大，市場秩序逐步規(guī)范，對于促進(jìn)我國港口生產(chǎn)將會(huì)起到積極的推動(dòng)作用。

三峽蓄水至135米后，長江上游三峽庫區(qū)航道條件和通航環(huán)境得到改善，將降低船舶運(yùn)輸成本。長江干線貨物吞吐量、外貿(mào)吞吐量可望保持一定幅度的增長。由于“非典”對正常經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易的干擾，不可避免地影響新貿(mào)易合同的簽訂，可能會(huì)造成下半年貨運(yùn)量增幅下降�？瓦\(yùn)將會(huì)隨著“非典”疫情的有效控制以及旅游禁令的解除逐步恢復(fù)，并較上半年有一定幅度增長。

1、煤炭

今年我國煤炭產(chǎn)量增幅較大，上半年產(chǎn)量總體上大于銷量的增長幅度。全年煤炭生產(chǎn)總量控制在13.5億噸左右。在保持國內(nèi)煤炭供求平衡的前提下，國家已經(jīng)明確延長鼓勵(lì)煤炭出口政策，煤炭出口力爭9000萬噸，比2002年增長5%，預(yù)計(jì)今年電力需求增幅將會(huì)穩(wěn)定在10%左右，增加煤炭用量7000萬噸以上；一系列重大基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施項(xiàng)目的推進(jìn)及相關(guān)行業(yè)繼續(xù)保持快速發(fā)展，估計(jì)冶金用煤仍將增長2000萬噸以上，達(dá)到2.2億噸左右。

下半年煤炭運(yùn)輸市場仍將穩(wěn)中有升，水運(yùn)貨源依然充足。此外，夏季用電高峰已經(jīng)到來，煤炭運(yùn)輸需求將持續(xù)旺盛，“北煤南運(yùn)”繼續(xù)保持增長。長江下游電力企業(yè)的紛紛擴(kuò)容，為內(nèi)河煤炭運(yùn)輸形勢進(jìn)一步趨好奠定了基礎(chǔ)。下半年煤炭運(yùn)力稍有增加，供求趨于平衡，運(yùn)價(jià)保持相對穩(wěn)定。

2、鐵礦石

今年鋼鐵工業(yè)繼續(xù)保持了生產(chǎn)高速增長。隨著國家基礎(chǔ)建設(shè)投資的進(jìn)一步加大，房地產(chǎn)、機(jī)械制造業(yè)、汽車和家電等耐用消費(fèi)品行業(yè)的旺盛需求，以及我國造船業(yè)的迅猛發(fā)展，預(yù)計(jì)我國今年鋼材消費(fèi)量繼續(xù)穩(wěn)步增長。由于國產(chǎn)鐵礦石無法滿足需求，且國內(nèi)礦的品質(zhì)不符合大部分鋼廠煉鋼的要求，進(jìn)口鐵礦石將繼續(xù)保持較高幅度的增長。

下半年鐵礦石運(yùn)輸市場仍將繼續(xù)保持持續(xù)增長的勢頭。預(yù)計(jì)2003年中國將進(jìn)口1.3-1.4億噸鐵礦石，進(jìn)口量仍大幅增長。二、三程運(yùn)輸貨量充足。內(nèi)河鐵礦石運(yùn)輸保持上升態(tài)勢。運(yùn)力供求基本平衡，運(yùn)價(jià)穩(wěn)中有升。

3、石油及其制品

為了滿足國民經(jīng)濟(jì)增長發(fā)展需要，全國原油加工量和主要產(chǎn)品產(chǎn)量將會(huì)適當(dāng)增加。預(yù)計(jì)2003年全國原油總加工量為2.2億噸以上。從國內(nèi)需求來看，隨著國民經(jīng)濟(jì)快速增長和全社會(huì)汽車保有量快速增長，油品的需求旺盛。今年我國原油的進(jìn)口量有一定起伏，但整體形勢為謹(jǐn)慎樂觀。目前國家發(fā)改委指出受“非典”影響，國內(nèi)油品消費(fèi)下降，應(yīng)適當(dāng)調(diào)整原油進(jìn)口進(jìn)度。隨著非典疫情得到有效控制，旅游等行業(yè)復(fù)蘇，燃料油、航油需求增加，下半年成品油南方銷區(qū)需求回升，運(yùn)量將增加。

4、集裝箱

據(jù)估計(jì)，非典對貿(mào)易的滯后影響將在未來1-2個(gè)季度內(nèi)顯現(xiàn)，第三季度外貿(mào)增長幅度可能有所回落。在“非典”疫情有效及時(shí)得到控制、中央以及各級政府部門積極采取刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)、擴(kuò)大外貿(mào)的鼓勵(lì)措施下，貿(mào)易簽約情況較好，運(yùn)輸旺季稍微滯后，可能延續(xù)到第四季度。預(yù)計(jì)全年集裝箱港口吞吐量將有25%以上的增幅。由于船公司在上半年的運(yùn)力投入比較謹(jǐn)慎，下半年運(yùn)力投入計(jì)劃增幅也不高，預(yù)計(jì)全年供需仍將保持基本平衡。總體上，運(yùn)價(jià)經(jīng)過一年多的恢復(fù)，已經(jīng)到了一個(gè)供求雙方均認(rèn)為較合理的范圍之內(nèi)，干線船公司多數(shù)實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利。下半年，遠(yuǎn)洋航線運(yùn)價(jià)上調(diào)的速度和幅度將有所減緩，美線、歐線將基本保持年中水平；近洋航線中，日本航線則依賴于夏季運(yùn)輸?shù)呢浽丛鲩L情況，如果增長明顯，則運(yùn)價(jià)持續(xù)低迷的狀況將會(huì)有所改觀，但供過于求的問題不能從根本上得到解決，日本航線運(yùn)價(jià)恢復(fù)的難度仍然很大。

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